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ABSTRACT  
 
There is overwhelming evidence that South Africa’s rivers are heavily polluted, a 
situation which is attributable to a large degree to poorly functioning and inefficiently 
managed waste water treatment works in municipalities. The evidence suggests, 
furthermore, that municipalities often do not comply with their constitutional obligation 
to provide water services in a sustainable manner and promote a safe and healthy 
environment. Such non-compliance infringes on people’s constitutionally guaranteed 
rights to a pollution-free environment and equitable access to sufficient and safe 
water. 
 
The problem is that municipalities are not properly managing the waste water 
treatment works (WWTWs) and not regulating industrial discharge into these works in 
accordance with the prescribed national norms and standards. 
 
The National Water Act 36 of 1998 and other related Acts provide for legal and 
informal enforcement mechanisms that criminalise acts of pollution. However, none 
of them have been effective in enforcing municipal compliance with the national 
norms and standards of effluent management. There are two main reasons for this. 
First, the constitutional structure does not allow the Minister responsible for water 
management to exercise direct supervision of the municipalities despite the functional 
relationship the Department of Water and Sanitation has with municipalities in 
respect of water. Secondly, the Constitution (1996) instructs the spheres of 
government to avoid legal processes and cooperate with one another by intervening 
to execute the function if the sphere responsible for the function lacks capacity.  
 
This thesis explores the possible use of two statutory instruments of cooperative 
government and intergovernmental relations as strategies to complement and 
support the conventional enforcement measures in the water sector: the 
establishment of water intergovernmental forums; and the use of implementation 
protocols to supervise municipalities that chronically lack capacity as a way of 
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providing targeted support and monitoring to facilitate an effective compliance and 
enforcement regime in the water sector.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
 
The Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) is responsible for ensuring that all 
South African citizens have equal and sustainable access to water and to the use of 
water resources.1 It is primarily responsible for the prevention of pollution of water 
resources,2 mandated to set and enforce norms and standards for drinking water 
quality and waste water quality or effluent discharge. Municipalities have a 
constitutional obligation to provide water services in an equitable and sustainable 
manner and to promote a healthy and safe environment, among other 
responsibilities.3 Muller’s practical explanation of the intergovernmental division of 
this function is that national government manages water in the river and 
municipalities manage water in the pipe.4 It is therefore the responsibility of both 
national and local government to ensure that all citizens have access to water 
equitably and sustainably.5 Municipalities are required to manage the Waste Water 
Treatment Works (WWTWs) according to national norms and standards prescribed 
by the DWS. Poor management of WWTWs by municipalities is one of the main 
                                                          
 
1
 Preamble to the National Water Act (1998). 
2
 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie (2009) 83.  
3
 Section 152, Constitution , Act No 108 of 1996 (especially  section 152(b) & (d)). 
4
 Muller (2009) 243. 
5
 Muller (2009) 245. 
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sources of pollution of water resources, especially rivers. The pollution of fresh water 
resources threatens citizens’ equitable and sustainable access to water. In order to 
solve this problem, better enforcement of national standards will be required, along 
with improved cooperative governance and intergovernmental relations in the water 
sector. The latter entails getting the DWS and municipalities to agree on processes 
and procedures to manage the WWTWs and other water resources for the benefit of 
all in the present and in the future.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement  
 
The DWS, in its capacity as the custodian of water resources,6 is mandated by the 
National Water Act 36 of 1998 (the NWA) to ensure that water resources ‘are 
protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled’ to prevent pollution 
and their degradation, among other goals.7 The NWA makes pollution of water 
resources a punishable offence and any person who contravenes the provisions of 
section 151(1) of the Act is guilty of a criminal offence.8 
 
                                                          
 
6
 Preamble to the Water Services Act (1997), ‘confirming the National Government’s role as custodian 
of the nation’s water resources.’ 
7
 Section 2(h) NWA (1998).  
8
 Section 151 NWA (1998) states that (1) No person may - (a) use water otherwise than as permitted 
under this Act; (b) fail to provide access to any books, accounts, documents or assets when required 
to do so under this Act; (c) fail to comply with any condition attached to a permitted water use under 
this Act; (d) fail to comply with a directive issued under section 19, 20, 53 or 118; (e) unlawfully and 
intentionally or negligently tamper or interfere with any waterwork or any seal or measuring device 
attached to a waterwork. 
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Municipalities operate and manage 8219 of 1155 WWTWs in the country and a 
significant number is reported as not complying with the water laws and regulations, 
in particular, the national norms and standards of effluent discharge. Out of the 821 
WWTWs that are managed by municipalities, 14% are reported to be in a good 
and/or excellent condition while 56% are in a very poor and/or critical state. This is an 
indication that the majority of WWTWs are not managed in accordance with the 
national norms and standards provided in terms of the Water Services Act 108 of 
1998 (the WSA).10  
 
To enforce compliance with these standards, the NWA empowers the DWS to issue 
directives in terms of sections 19, 20, 53 and 118 of the NWA and to approach the 
courts should such directives and other provisions specified in the NWA not be 
complied with.11 Neither directives nor court action have proved to be effective 
mechanisms for ensuring that municipalities comply; enforcement is made more 
difficult still because of the constitutional requirement that the spheres of government 
must exhaust all cooperative government processes and avoid legal proceedings 
against one another.12 In other words, the DWS is required by the Constitution to 
adopt a cooperative-governance approach and apply the principles of 
intergovernmental relations when forcing the organs of state,13 like municipalities, to 
comply with water laws and regulations.  
 
                                                          
 
9
 According to the 2011 Green Drop report, municipalities manage 821 WWTWs in 156 municipalities. 
The rest of the WWTWs are managed by national government (the Department of Public Works).  
10
 Section 9 WSA (1997). 
11
 Section 151(2) NWA (1998). 
12
 Section 41(1)(h)(vi): Constitution .  
13
 As defined in section 239 of the Constitution. 
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The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act14 (the IGRF Act), which gives effect 
to the principles of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations, provides 
for the organs of state to enter into implementation protocols to effectively implement 
a policy or provide a service that is dependent on different levels of government.15 
The problem is that DWS has not utilised the IGRF Act to buttress enforcement 
actions against municipalities to comply with norms and standards for the 
management of waste water quality.  
 
1.3  Significance of the Problem  
 
The protection and sustainable management of water resources is critical not only for 
basic human health but also for securing sufficient water for present and future 
generations. Water of good quality is necessary for domestic, environmental, 
industrial, recreational and agricultural uses. Preventing pollution also saves on water 
treatment costs and the rehabilitation of the environment. At a practical level, 
domestic users and the farming community are severely affected when rivers and 
other water resources are polluted. The agricultural sector is the biggest water user 
and is usually subjected to stringent conditions in terms of water use. It then 
becomes the responsibility of government to provide an assurance of the security 
and quality of the water supply for the benefit of the country’s health, economic and 
food production needs. Thus, the challenge of non-compliance by municipalities with 
                                                          
 
14
 Act 13 of 2005. 
15
 Section 35(1) of the IGRF Act 13 of 2005 provides that ‘where the implementation of a policy, the 
exercise of a statutory power, the performance of a statutory function or the provision of a service 
depends on the participation of organs of state in different governments, those organs of state must 
co-ordinate their actions in such a manner as may be appropriate or required in the circumstances, 
and may do so by entering into an implementation protocol.’ 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
the prescribed national norms and standards of effluent discharge requires urgent 
attention.  
 
The Rio+20 United Nations Conference in 2012 identified Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) as a post-2015 development agenda to succeed the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).16 During the debate on water and sanitation, the 
conference recognised the key role that ecosystems17 play in maintaining water 
quantity and quality, and pledged to support particular nations in protecting and 
sustainably managing their ecosystems.18 At a post Rio+20 South African 
workshop,19 the water sector panel identified the quality of drinking water and waste-
water quality management, among other things, as priority concerns to be listed on 
the post-2015 sustainable development agenda for South Africa. 
 
1.4  Research Questions  
 
This thesis addresses three questions: 
 
 (1)  Are municipalities complying with national standards of effluent  
  discharge? 
                                                          
 
16
 RIO+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 20-
22 June 2012. A Post-2015 Development Agenda is a process led by the UN that aims to help define 
the future global development framework that will succeed the UN Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). 
17
 Defined by Wikipedia as ‘a community of living organisms (plants, animals and microbes) in 
conjunction with the nonliving components of their environments (like air, water and mineral soil) 
interacting as a system.’ 
18
 Clause 122, under resolution for Water and Sanitation, Rio+20 conference (2012). 
19
 Held in Durban, 19-20 February 2013.  
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 (2)  How can the DWS effectively resolve non-enforcement in relation to 
  municipalities?  
(3)  How can the IGRF Act be used to assist the DWS in ensuring that 
municipalities comply with the NWA and related regulations? 
 
1.5 Argument  
 
Regarding the first issue, the thesis will draw on extensive statistical data to show 
that there is widespread and persistent non-compliance by municipalities with norms 
and standards for managing waste water or effluent discharge. Regarding the 
second, it is argued that there has been seriously inadequate enforcement by the 
DWS, but due to the fact that the intergovernmental structure of the sector hampers 
enforcement, alternative measures to encourage cooperation between the DWS and 
local government need to be explored. In respect of the third issue, this thesis argues 
that the IGRF Act can assist the DWS in enforcing compliance with the NWA and 
regulations thereof. This would entail establishing a water-sector intergovernmental 
relations (IGR) structure and using implementation protocols provided in section 35 of 
the IGRF Act as a mechanism to support compliance by municipalities by means of a 
more hands-on approach to coordination and supervision.  
 
1.6 Literature review  
 
Not much has been written on the subject of compliance in the water sector, which 
has largely been examined in the context of compliance with environmental 
sustainability. Although consideration of the principle of sustainability would involve 
water issues as part of specific environmental management acts (SEMAs), there is a 
need to address compliance with the implementation of the water-specific laws and 
regulations. A distinctive feature of this thesis is that it deals with compliance by 
governmental institutions (municipalities) with governmental laws and regulations. 
The underlying principle is that if the government is to enforce compliance with the 
rules, it needs to lead by example and be compliant itself.  
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The polluter-pays principle prescribed by national legislation20 and its corresponding 
legal prescripts for compliance and enforcement has not proven to be practically 
feasible in forcing municipalities to comply with nationally prescribed norms and 
standards for effluent discharge. In other words, the administrative process of issuing 
directives and the criminal option that allows for approaching the courts for recourse, 
respectively accorded the Minister, may not be appropriate in the case of organs of 
state in the context of institutionalised cooperative governance such as South 
Africa.21 
 
This thesis examines the applicability of the constitutional provisions of cooperative 
government and intergovernmental relations as a measure to coordinate compliance 
and enforcement within government. It proposes a cooperative water governance 
(CWG) approach by establishing a water sector intergovernmental structure where 
the DWS and local government will enter into implementation protocols and agree on 
processes and procedures to manage the WWTWs. One of the advantages of the 
implementation protocols is that not only non-compliance by the regulated 
municipalities, but also non-enforcement by the regulator (the DWS) gets addressed.  
 
Algotsson and Murombo22 examine municipal accountability in relation to 
environmental rights, focusing on water pollution caused by the discharge of 
untreated effluent into rivers. They argue that the enforcement measures are not 
effective enough to get municipalities to account for failure to provide water services 
in a sustainable manner. They maintain that the limitation of the principle of 
                                                          
 
20
 Section 19 NWA (1998) and s 2 NEMA (1998).  
21
 Section 53 NWA (1998).  
22
 Algotsson and Murombo, (2009) 29.  
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cooperative government integrated planning could facilitate the necessary 
convergence between water services, further to which they suggest strengthening the 
principle of participation to promote the involvement of the public and thereby 
heighten accountability in the decision-making process.23 However, they also caution 
that this should be well coordinated as it may prove disastrous otherwise.  
.  
In their edited study, Paterson and Kotzé24 argue for alternative approaches to 
compliance and enforcement in managing ongoing environmental degradation.25 The 
study examines compliance and enforcement measures in relation to both the private 
and public sectors. It highlights voluntary approaches as more effective than those 
traditional administrative and judicial approaches mentioned above and argues for 
reduced regulations or none at all. This thesis focuses on compliance and 
enforcement in the public sector and emphasises the use of cooperative government 
and intergovernmental relations principles as alternative measures to resolve non-
compliance and non-enforcement by organs of state.  
 
Eddy26 argues that addressing non-compliance by state organs through cooperative 
government is a double standards approach and that all non-compliant water users 
should face the consequences as prescribed in the law. She investigates the 
effectiveness of the implementation of the NWA in regulating the discharge of waste 
water, in particular the sewage effluent discharged into the environment. She 
concludes that the implementation of the NWA regulations fall short and its 
effectiveness is dependent, inter alia, on subjecting all water users to the same rules. 
                                                          
 
23
Algotsson and Murombo(2009) 3. 
24
 Paterson & Kotzé (2009).  
25
 Lehmann (2009) 294. 
26
 Eddy (2003) 104. 
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This is a logical argument but not a prudent one from the point of view of utilising 
public resources efficiently and in a transparent manner. It may also have 
implications in the form of increased tariffs for the provision of basic services which 
would in turn militate against the government’s objective of ensuring equitable and 
sustainable access to basic services by all. The organs of state are constitutionally 
required to foster friendly relations among themselves, preserve the peace, national 
unity and protect the state’s resources.27  
 
This thesis follows Hofmeyr28 in emphasising effective intergovernmental relations as 
a crucial mechanism for addressing failing municipal water supply services. She 
identifies supervision, intervention and judicial action as three measures available for 
use by provincial government to address the challenge of failing municipal water 
supply services. She argues that such measures are intrusive in nature and may 
encroach on the autonomy of local government.29 Intergovernmental alternative 
dispute resolution measures are preferred as a response for the benefit of ‘millions of 
South Africans who have the right to an environment not detrimental to their health or 
well-being and the right of access to sufficient water.’30 
 
The approach of using cooperative governance and applying the principles of 
intergovernmental relations in forcing the organs of state to comply has been 
adopted as an international practice. The United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEPA)31 established an International Network for Environmental 
                                                          
 
27
 Section 41, Constitution (1996) & INECE (1992) 3.  
28
 Hofmeyr (2012).  
29
 Hofmeyr (2012) 109. 
30
 Hofmeyr (2012) 110-11. 
31
 Regarded as highly knowledgeable in the area of environmental management  
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Compliance and Enforcement (INECE) for dealing with compliance and enforcement 
by organs of state.32 INECE compiled a list of principles which avoid sanctions, civil 
and criminal processes but which promote and encourage alternative compliance and 
enforcement processes especially applicable to organs of state. 
 
A report by the Centre for Environmental Rights (CER) identifies cooperative 
governance as one of the areas to improve in order to make a positive impact on 
water governance in South Africa.33 This recommendation is supported but it is taken 
further to suggest the adoption of practical and implementable protocols that address 
specific service delivery areas with clear outcomes, timeframes and allocation of 
roles to parties participating in the protocol.  
 
The signing of implementation protocols is proposed against the backdrop of various 
reviews that have been conducted and that found some weaknesses with the existing 
IGR structures and/or service delivery forums. According to a Presidential Ten-Year 
Review on intergovernmental relations in South Africa, the IGR forums should have 
in place agreed systems and procedures for effective implementation of policies.34 
The National Development Plan (NDP) argues that the numerous IGR forums which 
have been established within and across spheres focus more on coordination of joint 
programmes instead of designing processes and procedures to improve 
performance.35 Addressing the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) in Parliament 
during the debate on Local Government policy review, the Deputy Minister of the 
Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (the DM of CoGTA) 
                                                          
 
32
 INECE Principles of Environmental enforcement (1992) 8, 14. 
33
 Fourie M (2012) 2.  
34
 Layman T A Ten Year Review (2003) 23.   
35
 National Development Plan (2011) 386-7. 
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stated that the area of intergovernmental relations has been identified as critical to 
facilitate an effective and responsive government. He highlighted some interventions 
by government to strengthen cooperative governance and intergovernmental 
relations (IGR) structures for effective coordination of the government’s programme 
of action.36 
 
1.7  Structure of the thesis  
 
This chapter has presented the outline of the research problem and its significance, 
and identified the research questions that will be responded to. Chapter 2 presents 
the legal and institutional framework for water regulation in South Africa. It discusses 
the water regulatory framework in the context of fundamental water policy principles 
of efficiency, sustainability and equity, demonstrating the relationship and 
convergence in the management of water services provision and water resources. It 
outlines the water sector institutional framework and the related constitutional 
obligations to implement such principles in a manner consistent with prescribed 
human rights values.37 Chapter 3 demonstrates that municipalities do not comply with 
national norms and standards of effluent discharge. It argues that municipalities do 
not adhere to their legal obligation to provide water services in an equitable and 
sustainable manner and to promote a healthy and safe environment. However, 
municipalities alone cannot be blamed for non-compliance as it is the responsibility of 
all the spheres of government to ensure efficient water services provision that 
complies with national norms and standards.  
 
                                                          
 
36
 Deputy Minister in the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA)   
Deputy Minister  RSA Parliament (2013).  
37
 Contained in ss 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the Constitution (1996). 
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Chapter 4 discusses different approaches to resolve non-enforcement of organs of 
state that do not comply with water policy and its regulations. The cooperative 
government approach as provided for in the IGRF Act38 is discussed as one of the 
alternative and preferred mechanism to enforce compliance. A motivation is given 
that specifically the Implementation Protocol provided for in section 35 of the Act not 
only assists the DWS with non-enforcement but helps to regulate intergovernmental 
relations.39 Lastly, the existing IGR structures are examined in terms of how they can 
be strengthened through using implementation protocols in order to resolve the 
challenge of non-compliance and non-enforcement. This mini-thesis concludes by 
arguing that although the IGRF Act is not mandatory, it does encourage a 
strengthened cooperative governance process. Thus it remains a solution for the 
effective implementation of policy and legislation at all spheres of government.  
 
1.8 Methodology 
 
This research project is a desk-based study that focuses on the analysis of primary 
and secondary sources. It relies on government reports to ascertain the extent of 
non-compliance with the water laws by municipalities and what the DWS has done to 
enforce compliance. Statistical evidence has been presented and analysed to 
illustrate the extent of non-compliance by municipalities and available enforcement 
measures which can be used to resolve challenges of compliance and enforcement. 
Secondary material of how experts and other authors have dealt with the subject of 
cooperative governance as a response to organs of state in general not complying 
with the laws has been examined. The Constitution (1996), the National Water Act 36 
of 1998, the Water Services Act 108 of 1997 and the National Environmental 
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 Act 13 of 2005. 
39
 Chapter 3, IGRF Act (2005). 
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Management Act (NEMA) 107 of 1998 have been used as a basis for water 
regulatory framework in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR WATER 
REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The post-1994 water law reform framework in South Africa identified efficiency, equity 
and sustainability as fundamental guiding principles for the protection, use, 
development, conservation, management and control of water resources.40 The 
framework promotes an approach of integrated water resources management 
(IWRM) which requires a balance in terms of quantity and quality to guarantee the 
reliability of water.41 Managing this balance necessitates a close working relationship 
between water services provision and water resources management.42  
 
This chapter discusses the water regulatory framework in South Africa in the context 
of the abovementioned fundamental water policy principles of efficiency, equity and 
sustainability. Such principles derive from and give effect to the constitutional values 
                                                          
 
40
 White Paper on Water Policy: South Africa (1997) and section 2 NWA (1998) 
41
 Principle 7, Annexure 1 to the White Paper on Water Policy: South Africa (1997): ‘The objective of 
managing the quantity, quality and reliability of the nation’s water resources is to achieve optimum, 
long term, environmentally sustainable social and economic benefit for society from their use.’ 
42
 Principle 26, Annexure 1 to the national Water Policy (1997): ‘Water services shall be regulated in a 
manner which is consistent with and supportive of the aims and approaches of the broader local 
government framework.’ 
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that promote the right to a pollution-free environment and to safe and adequate 
water.43 The roles of water services within the water regulatory framework are 
discussed as well as how these are executed in the context of cooperative 
government and intergovernmental relations as provided for by the Constitution.44  
 
2.2 Legal Framework for Water Regulation in South Africa 
 
The Water Services Act 108 of 1997 and the National Water Act 36 of 1998 are the 
two key pieces of legislation that regulate the water sector in South Africa. The 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) is a further significant 
regulatory instrument contributing to the legal framework for water regulation. NEMA 
requires the process of environmental impact assessment (EIA) to always precede 
the development of water infrastructure projects for better management of water and 
environmental sustainability.45 National water policy reinforces the principle of 
sustainability in NEMA by requiring water resource development and supply activities 
to be managed in a manner that is consistent with the broader national approaches 
to environmental management.46 
 
These three pieces of legislation constitute the legal framework for water regulation in 
South Africa, giving effect to the constitutional values contained in the Bill of Rights of 
                                                          
 
43
 Sections 24 and 27 of the Constitution. Principle 1, Annexure 1 to the National Water Policy (1997): 
‘While taking cognisance of existing uses, the water law will actively promote the values enshrined in 
the Bill of Rights.’ 
44
 Section 41 Constitution. 
45
 Strategic Framework for Water Services (2003).  
46
 Principle 17 to the White Paper on Water Policy (1997). 
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the Constitution.47 There is thus an important and close relationship between 
chapters 2 (the Bill of Rights) and 3 (cooperative government) of the Constitution 
which is necessary for effective and sustainable service delivery.48 
 
2.2.1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996  
 
The Bill of Rights in the Constitution guarantees basic human rights to all people of 
South Africa. Among other things, it affords everyone the right to live in an 
environment that is not harmful to health and well-being and to have access to 
sufficient water, extending these benefits to future generations.49 The Constitution 
sets out the objectives of local government, including to provide water services in a 
sustainable manner and to promote a safe and healthy environment.50  
 
The local government legislation51 gives effect to this constitutional imperative and it 
provides for municipalities to promote a safe and healthy environment in their 
localities and cooperate with other spheres of government for the realisation of the 
fundamental rights contained in sections 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the Constitution.52 
In the Grootboom case the Constitutional Court ruled that the state is obliged to give 
                                                          
 
47
 Chapter Two of the Constitution   described as a human rights charter that protects the civil, 
political and socio-economic rights of all people in South Africa. 
48
 Especially sections 24 and 27, Constitution . 
49
 Levy & Tapscott (2001) 9. 
50
 Section 152. 
51
 Section 2(4)(i) & (j), Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 (2000) MSA .  
52
 These are the rights to pollution-free environment, property, housing, health care, food, water, social 
security and education. 
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effect to rights provided for in sections 24 and 27 of the Constitution as it is an 
obligation that courts can, and in appropriate circumstances, must enforce.53 The 
Constitution54 mandates national and provincial governments to support and 
strengthen the capacity of municipalities in the execution of their functions and for all 
the spheres to take collective accountability for service delivery.55 
 
2.2.2 Water Services Act 108 of 1997  
 
The Water Services Act (WSA) is the principal regulatory framework for water 
services institutions, which are mainly municipalities, giving effect to the Bill of Rights 
by providing for access to basic water supply and sanitation services necessary to 
secure sufficient water and an environment not harmful to human health or well-
being.56 In order to achieve this objective, the WSA requires water services 
institutions to promote effective water resource management.57 Municipalities have a 
duty to protect the quality of water resources and ensure their sustainability in the 
interests of all water users,58 thus managing water in an integrated manner.59 In order 
                                                          
 
53
 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (CCT11/00) [2000] 
ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA - (2004), paragraph 94: Judge Yacoob said “I am conscious that it is an 
extremely difficult task for the state to meet these obligations in the conditions that prevail in our 
country. This is recognised by the Constitution which expressly provides that the state is not obliged to 
go beyond available resources or to realise these rights immediately. I stress however, that despite all 
these qualifications, these are rights, and the Constitution obliges the state to give effect to them. This 
is an obligation that courts can, and in appropriate circumstances, must enforce”.  
 
54
 154(1) Constitution (1996).  
55
 Section 41, especially (1)(c), Constitution (1996) and s 4, IGRF Act (2005). 
56
 Section 2 WSA (1997), giving effect to sections 24 & 27 Constitution. 
57
 Section 2(j), WSA (1997).  
58
 Water users include domestic (consumption) users and industrial/agricultural users. 
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to ensure that water services are managed in a manner that balances quantity, 
quality and reliability, section 9 of the Act empowers the Minister to prescribe 
compulsory national norms and standards relating to the provision of water 
services.60  
 
2.2.3 National Water Act 36 of 1998  
 
The National Water Act (NWA) gives effect to the post-1994 water law reforms and is 
a key piece of legislation to facilitate principles of efficiency, equity and sustainability 
within the water sector. The reforms introduced by the NWA require equitable 
allocation of water to all water users and it places importance on managing the 
effects of water use on the land, especially the water environment and/or resource. 
The NWA61 identifies eleven types of water use which may have a detrimental effect 
on the water resource. Water uses in sections 21(f), (g) & (f),62 which relate to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
59
 Principle 15, National Water Policy of South Africa (1997): ‘Water quality and quantity are 
interdependent and shall be managed in an integrated manner which is consistent with the broader 
environmental management approaches.’ 
60
 Sections 9(1) and 3(g), WSA (1997): ‘The Minister may from time to time prescribe compulsory 
national standards relating to—(a) the provision of water services; (b) the quality of water taken from 
or discharged into any water services or water resource system; (c) the effective and sustainable use 
of water resources for water services; (d) the nature, operation, sustainability, operational efficiency 
and economic viability of water services; (e) requirements for persons who install and operate water 
services works; and (f) the construction and functioning of water services works and consumer 
installations.’ 
61
 Section 21(a)-(k). 
62
 Section 21 defines water use as including (f) discharging waste or water containing waste into a 
water resource through a pipe, canal, sewer, sea outfall or other conduit; (g) disposing of waste in a 
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management of Waste Water Treatment Works (WWTWs), are the main focus of this 
mini-thesis. 
 
The NWA replaced the Water Act 54 of 1956 (Water Act) which focused on the 
management of surface water supply and quantity, giving priority to the agricultural 
and industrial sectors. The common element in these two pieces of legislation is that 
they regulate water use through the issuing of permits and water use licences, 
respectively. They also set norms and standards to regulate the discharge of waste 
water or effluent.63 To achieve the reforms as guided by the principles of equity and 
sustainability, the NWA must authorise water use with conditions in order to regulate 
the use, flow and control of all water in the country.64 The post-1994 reforms, one of 
which is the promotion of the ‘polluter pays’ principle, are said to be a global trend in 
the water sector. The reforms aim to emphasise government control over all water 
resources to achieve the ‘best possible water use in the interest of the public’.65 Any 
contravention of the provisions of the NWA is a punishable offence.  
 
2.2.4 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998  
 
The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) is a national 
environmental management framework legislation which defines the environment as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
manner which may detrimentally impact on a water resource; (h) disposing in any manner of water 
which contains waste from, or which has been heated in, any industrial or power generation process. 
63
 NWRS2 (2013) 70. 
64
 Section 3, NWA (1998). 
65
 Thompson (2006) 139. 
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including land and water resources.66 NEMA is consistent with the NWA as it seeks 
to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, among other things. It states that 
everyone has the right to have the environment protected for the benefit of present 
and future generations.67 Pollution is defined as any emission from an activity related 
to the provision of services that can have an adverse effect on human health or the 
well-being of the ecosystem in the present or in the future.68 Similar to the WSA and 
the NWA, NEMA prescribes national norms and standards for environmental 
governance to achieve social, environmental and economic sustainability.69 Similar to 
the NWA, NEMA promotes a ‘polluter pays’ principle for the rehabilitation of the 
environment.70  
 
2.2.5 Other relevant pieces of legislation  
 
Compliance with South Africa’s water regulatory laws is broad and complex and is 
not limited to the implementation of the abovementioned water and environmental 
legislation and related policies. The Water Stewardship Institute outlines a number of 
functions that impact and are impacted by such water regulatory policies and 
regulations. The Biodiversity Act71 deals with the protection of water resources. The 
                                                          
 
66
 Definition xi(i) NEMA (1998): ‘environment means the surroundings within which humans exist and 
that are made up of land, water and atmosphere of the earth.’ 
67
 Preamble to the NEMA Act (1009).  
68
 Definition xxiv, NEMA (1997). 
69
 Section 2(3) NEMA (1998). 
70
 Sections 1, 2 and 28 NEMA (1998). 
71
 National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004).  
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Waste Act72 seeks to prevent and regulate waste discharge by setting norms and 
standards and issuing waste licences with conditions. The objective of the Integrated 
Coastal Management Act (ICM Act)73 is to protect and preserve the coastal zone, 
which is defined as including estuaries and wetlands, the latter classified and defined 
as water resources in terms of the NWA.74 The Mineral and Petroleum Resource 
Development Act (MPRDA)75 provides for possible recovery of water rehabilitation 
costs and consultation with the department responsible for water management before 
issuing a closure certificate. The National Health Act76 empowers a Health Officer, 
working with a municipality, to investigate any action believed to have violated a right 
to a pollution-free environment and that has caused pollution detrimental to health.77 
The Health Act78 provides for duties and powers of municipalities and these include a 
requirement for a local authority to ‘prevent the pollution of any water intended for the 
use of the inhabitants of its district, irrespective of whether such water is obtained 
                                                          
 
72
 National Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008. 
73
 National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 24 of 2008. 
74
 Definitions (ix) & (xxix) NWA (1998): ‘estuary’ means a partially or fully enclosed body of water - (a) 
which is open to the sea permanently or periodically; and (b) within which the sea water can be 
diluted, to an extent that is measurable, with fresh water drained from land; a ‘wetland' means land 
which is transitional between terrestrial and aquatic systems where the water table is usually at or near 
the surface, or the land is periodically covered with shallow water, and which land in normal 
circumstances supports or would support vegetation typically adapted to life in saturated soil. 
75
 Act 28 of 2002. 
76
 Act 61 of 2003. 
77
 Sections 83(1)(a) & (b) and 83(3) National Health Act 61 0f 2003. 
78
 Section 20(1)(c), Health Act 63 (1997). 
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from sources within or outside its district, or to purify such water which has become 
so polluted’.  
 
All the above pieces of legislation make non-compliance a punishable criminal 
offence. Penalties could take the form of a fine or imprisonment, irrespective of 
whether the non-compliant party is the government or from the private sector.79  
 
2.3 Institutional framework for water regulation in South Africa  
 
Achieving the objective of managing water in an efficient, equitable and sustainable 
manner depends on the effective management of the entire water value chain. 
Considering Muller’s explanation above, good governance of the water value chain is 
managing water from the river to the pipe and back to the river. It entails integrated 
water planning, water use efficiency and effective water institutions, among other 
things.80 The alignment of municipal integrated development plans (IDP) with the 
water services development plans (WSDPs) is the basis for effective management of 
the water value chain. The WSDPs are water management plans which facilitate the 
participation of local government in the national water development programme as a 
constitutional requirement.81 
                                                          
 
79
 Sections 22, 23 and 24(5) of Water Act (1956); s 151(2) of NWA (1998); s 82(1)(g) of WSA (1997); 
ss32- 34 of NEMA (1998); s 112 of Systems Act (2000); ss83 & 89(2)of the National Health Act 
(2003); s57 of Health Act (1977); ss102&102 of Biodiversity Act (2004); ss79&80 of Integrated Coastal 
Management Act (2008); ss67&68 of Waste Act (2008) and ss98&99 of MPRDA (2002). 
80
 NWRS2 (2013) 102. 
81
 Section 24(2) Systems Act (2000): ‘Municipalities must participate in national and provincial 
development programmes as required in section 153(b) of the Constitution.’ 
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The mandate to ensure water availability and to provide water services is a national 
and local government competence, respectively. The provincial sphere has no 
specifically assigned role in water management. However, in terms of the 
Constitution and the provision of NEMA, environmental management and pollution 
control are concurrent functional areas of national and provincial competence.82  
 
The DWS is therefore forced to explore alternative compliance enforcement tools and 
approaches. One such approach would be to strengthen cooperative government 
and establish water-sector intergovernmental relations forums conducted by means 
of Implementation Protocols, as provided for in section 35 of the IGRF Act.  
 
2.3.1 National government and the water value chain 
 
National government has a constitutional mandate in terms of sections 154(1) and 
155(7) to support and regulate local government, respectively in order for the local 
sphere to effectively perform its functions as listed under parts B of schedules 4 and 
5, particularly related to water and sanitation services. It has a regulatory function to 
protect the country’s water resources through prescribing national norms and 
standards for water use which include effluent discharge for waste water treatment 
collector systems.83 It has an obligation to support local government to implement the 
WSDPs and promote effective water resource management, water conservation and 
demand.84 As the regulator, the DWS has oversight responsibility of the contractual 
relationships between water services authorities and water services providers and 
                                                          
 
82
 Schedule 4, Part A of the Constitution (1996) and Preamble to NEMA (1998).  
83
 Sections 21(e) and (f) of NWA (1998) are relevant in this thesis. 
84
 Section 2(j) WSA (1997). 
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intermediaries.85 This is necessary to ensure compliance with protecting water 
resources in the interests of all consumers.86  
 
2.3.2 Local government and the water value chain  
 
Local government has a constitutional mandate to provide basic service delivery 
needs, central to which is water provision.87 It is responsible for the promotion of a 
safe and healthy environment, part of which is the efficient management of waste 
water and effluent discharge.88 It is mandated to provide water and sanitation 
services limited to potable water supply systems, domestic waste water and sewage 
disposal systems, refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal.89 Solid 
waste includes sludge from a waste water treatment plant, from a water supply 
treatment plant or air pollution control resulting from industrial, commercial, mining 
and agricultural operations.90  
 
                                                          
 
85
 Section 8 of NWRS2. 
86
 Section 4(2)(i) WSA (1997) promotion of a safe and healthy environment in the municipality; s 9(1) 
WSA (1997): ‘The Minister may from time to time prescribe compulsory national standards relating to 
(a) the provision of water services, (b) the quality of water taken from or discharged into any water 
services or water resource system’. NWRS2 (2013) 16. 
87
 Sections 152(1)(b)&(d) and 152(2) Constitution . 
88
 Section 4(2)(i) Systems Act SYSTEMS ACT (2000). 
89
 Schedules 4B & 5B, Constitution (1996). 
90
 Available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8732html (accessed 12 November 2014). 
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Local government, through the designated Water Services Authorities (WSAs),91 has 
the power to determine and regulate local water policies, norms and standards and 
make by-laws.92 De Visser calls this a principled approach that allows local 
government its constitutional obligation to regulate the detail of schedule 4B 
functions.93 A water services authority is any municipality, including a district or local 
municipality, responsible for ensuring access to water services in terms of the Local 
Government: Structures Act 117 of 1998 (the Structures Act).94 or the ministerial 
authorisation using the same Act.95 WSAs may perform the function of a water 
service provider but their core function is to plan, set and regulate local policies and 
by-laws that conform to national legislation, norms and standards.96 While a Local 
municipality must be expressly designated, the Structures Act automatically 
designates all district municipalities as WSAs to achieve the integrated, sustainable 
and equitable social and economic development of its area as a whole.97 To date 
there are a total of one hundred and fifty six (156) WSAs managing waste water 
treatment plants and these include all district municipalities and the designated local 
municipalities.  
                                                          
 
91
 The WSAs are municipalities determined in terms of Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 
118 of 1998 (Structures Act) or Ministerial authorisation.  
92
 Sections 11 & 21 Water Services Act (1997) and Local Government Municipal Structures Act 
(1998). 
93
 De Visser (2004) 170, acknowledging the provisions of the WSA, especially sections 11(2)(g) and 
11(6). 
94
 Section 84. 
95
 Section 84(3) Structures Act (1998) and Strategic Framework for Water Services (2003) 11-12.  
96
 Chapters 3–5 WSA (1997). 
97
 Section 83(3) Structures Act (1998). 
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The water value chain, appearing as figure 1 below, reflects the functions of national 
government overseeing water services and water resources management. It is 
important to note that the institutions that have the mandate to manage water are at 
local government level. Thus, the implementation of policy and legislation is 
coordinated at local government level for the realisation of national priorities.98  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
98
 Section 4(b)&(c) IGRF Act (2005)  
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Figure 1: The water value chain 
 
 
Source: NWRS2, 2013, figure 11, page 62  
 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has outlined an extensive legal framework for water regulation in South 
Africa, discussing this in relation to the post-1994 principles of equity and 
sustainability. The chapter further demonstrated that there is a relationship between 
the management of water services and water resources, with the WSA and NWA 
being the two main pieces of legislation which regulate water services and water 
resources, respectively. The latter two pieces of legislation give effect to the 
constitutional values that guarantee equal access to safe and adequate water and to 
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a pollution-free environment. In terms of the Constitution with respect to the water 
value chain, the institutions that are responsible for managing water are at local and 
national levels of government. However, the post-1994 water sector reforms 
identified water as the catalyst for sustainable socio-economic development as it 
affects and is affected by various other service delivery areas of government. 
Therefore using the principles of cooperative governance and intergovernmental 
relations is inevitable in the water management regime. The next chapter examines 
the extent to which municipalities comply with their legal obligation to provide water 
services in an equitable and sustainable manner. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
 
COMPLIANCE BY MUNICIPALITIES WITH THE WATER 
LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the local government sphere is an integral part 
of the water value chain, charged with the responsibility to manage water services 
and waste water in an environmentally responsible and sustainable manner.99 It has 
an obligation to promote water resource protection and a safe and healthy 
environment, which involves the efficient management of waste water and/or effluent 
discharge.100 Efficient management of waste water discharges, among other things, 
requires the water services authority (WSAs) to regulate individuals and companies 
discharging into WWTWs through the enactment and enforcement of by-laws that 
conform to the national norms and standards of effluent discharge.101  
 
This chapter focuses on the extent to which municipalities, in operating and 
managing the WWTWs, comply with nationally prescribed norms and standards for 
managing effluent discharge. To this effect, the chapter draws on statistical data from 
the 2013 national Green Drop assessment report and 2013 Municipal Strategic Self-
                                                          
 
99
 National Water Services Regulation Strategy (2010) 10. 
100
 Section 4(2)(i) Systems Act (2000). 
101
 Section 9, WSA (1997). 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
Assessment (MuSSA) report.102 The latter are the two programmes used by the DWS 
to monitor municipalities in terms of compliance requirements relating to waste water 
treatment works and institutional performance. The assessment of compliance is 
limited to general norms and standards and does not deal with compliance with 
specific technical requirements. It looks at the overall compliance with norms and 
standards by municipalities as well as the other spheres of government play their 
respective roles in ensuring equitable access to water services and water resources 
by all citizens.103 
 
3.2  Compliance  
 
Compliance is a state of adherence to a particular set of legal requirements, and it 
occurs when such requirements are met and desired changes are achieved.104 
Municipal compliance with regard to waste water management is about meeting the 
prescribed national norms and standards for effluent discharge.105 In 2003 Cabinet 
approved a Strategic Framework for Water Services (SFWS), which is a review of the 
1997 White Paper on Water Policy and sets out the vision, goals and targets for the 
                                                          
 
102
 Both these reports were published in 2013 by the then DWA. 
103
Preamble to the WSA: ‘although municipalities have authority to administer water supply services 
and sanitation services, all spheres of Government have a duty, within the limits of physical and 
financial feasibility, to work towards this object’. Fourie M (2012) 9: ‘lack of access to services should 
not be attributed to failure by local government to implement policies but to lack of meaningful 
cooperative governance across government.’ 
104
 DWA Enforcement Manual; Principles of enforcement. 
105
 Section 26 Local Government Municipal Systems Act (2000); Smith (2009) 9.  
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water sector.106 The SFWS set the goals for the sector as including the regulation of 
water services to ensure access to adequate, safe, affordable and sustainable water 
services for all. The National Water Services Regulation Strategy (NWSRS)107 
prescribed ten key performance measures (see footnote 108 below) for the WSAs to 
monitor.108 The regulation strategy prioritised the quality of national drinking water 
and waste water (effluent) as key risk areas needing urgent attention to protect health 
and the environment.109 This thesis focuses on the fourth and tenth performance 
measures relating to waste water quality management110 and institutional 
effectiveness. These are relevant for the Green Drop audit and the MuSSA 
processes which are the programmes used by the DWS to monitor compliance by 
municipalities with the relevant prescripts of managing the effluent discharge and 
institutional performance.  
 
                                                          
 
106
 SFWS (2003) 3-5. 
107
 Approved in 2010 by the Department of Water Affairs.  
108
 NWSRS (2010) 34 – 35 lists following Performance measures: 1.Access to basic water supply 
services; 2.Access to basic sanitation services; 3.Drinking water quality; 4.Impact on the environment; 
5.Strategic asset management; 6.Water demand management; 7.Basic sanitation services; 8. 
Customer service standards; 9.Financial performance and 10. Institutional effectiveness. 
109
 NWSRS (2010).  
110
 SFWS (2003) 7 and Annexure 2 to SFWS.  
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3.2.1 Municipalities must comply with requirements for purification of waste water or 
effluent  
Municipalities are expected to comply with Regulation 991111 which requires the 
purification of waste water or effluent produced by or resulting from the use of water 
for industrial purposes. The regulation prescribes that  
 
(1) any person using for industrial purposes water, including sea water brought 
ashore, shall (a) purify or otherwise treat the water so used and any effluent 
produced by or resulting from such use, in accordance with such requirements 
as the Minister may from time to time, after consultation with the South African 
Bureau of Standards mentioned in the Standards Act 30 of 1982 prescribe by 
notice in the Gazette generally or in relation to water used for any particular 
industrial purpose, or in relation to water or effluent to be disposed of by 
discharging it into any particular public stream or into the sea, or in relation to 
water or effluent to be disposed of in any particular area. 
 
The regulation is relevant for the implementation of the NWA, which requires 
authorisation in the form of a Water Use Licence (WUL). A WUL (a permit in terms of 
the 1956 Water Act) prescribes conditions for the three water uses: 
(a) Section 21(f) for discharging waste or water containing waste into a water 
resource through a pipe, canal, sewer, sea outfall or other conduit;  
(b) Section 21(g) for disposing of waste and waste water in a manner which 
may detrimentally impact on the water resource, whether it is a surface or 
groundwater stream;  
 (c) Section 21(h) for disposing in any manner of water which contains waste  
 from, or which has been heated in, any industrial or power generation process. 
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 Published in GN 2834 of 1984. 
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3.2.2 Municipalities must comply with regulations relating to compulsory national 
standards for process controllers and water services works  
Regulation 17112 prescribes compulsory national standards for Process Controllers 
and Water Services Works.113 It prescribes national norms and standards for the 
construction, enlargement, registration, operation and functioning of water services 
works waste water treatment works (WWTWs). It thus gives effect to section 26(1)(e) 
and (f) of the NWA114 for:  
  
(e) regulating the design, construction, installation, operation and maintenance 
of any waterworks, where it is necessary or desirable to monitor any water use 
or to protect a water resource, and  
(f) requiring qualifications for and registration of persons authorised to design, 
construct, install, operate and maintain any waterworks, in order to protect the 
public and to safeguard human life and property. 
  
                                                          
 
112
 GN 36958 of 2013 (Regulation 17). Regulation 17 defines a “process controller” as any natural 
person who has achieved the relevant competencies to effectively operate a unit process at a water 
services work or who is qualified and authorised to design and supervise the construction, installation, 
operation and maintenance of any water services work and who is employed by either a water 
services institution, a water services work owner, or a company actively involved with the treatment 
and professional monitoring of water services works or water containing waste in some way or the 
other.  
113
 Definition (xxviii), NWA (1998) “waterwork includes any borehole, structure, earthwork or 
equipment installed or used for or in connection with water use”. In the context of this thesis a water 
services works refers to a water treatments works (WTWs) and a waste water treatment works 
(WWTWs).  
114
 Section 26(f) NWA (1998). 
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The new regulations seek to streamline and professionalise the operations of 
WWTWs by promoting skills and the education of those people who are entrusted 
with protecting the nation’s water resources and providing the public with safe 
drinking water. The latter view is consistent with that of Smith,115 who argues for 
giving priority to strengthening the capacity of Process Controllers, who are 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the WWTWs. He maintains that 
technical compliance would be addressed by paying attention to practical challenges 
such as technical skills, finances and institutional realignment.116 In this respect, 
Regulation 17 is an effective response. Having a suitably qualified Process Controller 
is a critical requirement for compliant WWTWs.  
 
3.3 Municipalities do not comply with national norms and standards of 
effluent discharge  
 
In terms of the NWA a water resource should be protected from water use activities 
which affect the quantity, quality of water as well as the environment surrounding the 
water resource.117 Such water use activities include those listed in section 21(a) to (k) 
of the NWA; the relevant ones for this thesis are (f), (g) and (h),118 which concern any 
                                                          
 
115
 Smith (2009) 3 and 16. Is it not  comer between separate pages instead of ‘and’? 
116
 Smith (2009) 13. 
117
 NWSRS (2010). 
118
 ‘(e) engaging in a controlled activity identified as such in section 37(1) or declared under section 
38(1); (f) discharging waste or water containing waste into a water resource through a pipe, canal, 
sewer, sea outfall or other conduit; (g) disposing of waste in a manner which may detrimentally impact 
on a water resource; (h) disposing in any manner of water which contains waste from, or which has 
been heated in, any industrial or power generation process.’ 
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activity that involves discharging waste water into a river and has a major impact on 
the water environment. The then Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, 
Minister Sonjica, responding to a parliamentary question119 in 2009, explained that 
the discharges of treated sewage (largely by municipalities) into water courses120 can 
only take place with a permit or licence, issued in terms of the NWA. Such a permit 
will generally stipulate the required quality of the discharged effluent, and will require 
regular testing of that effluent with submission of the results to the Department of 
Water Affairs as the regulator. In her reply, Minister Sonjica reported that out of 821 
WWTWs managed by the municipalities, 503 WWTWs (see Appendix A) were non-
compliant with the effluent discharge standards121 and were operating without water 
use authorisations.  
 
Figure 2 and Table 1 below show the extent of non-compliance of WWTWs per 
province during 2008/2009 financial year. These statistics were captured during the 
initial stages of the establishment of the regulatory section of the then Department of 
Water Affairs to provide baseline information for the development of the regulations 
for the water sector. Both the figurative and tabular presentations reflect the 
authorisation and/or the compliant status of WWTWs per province, with a breakdown 
of different types and/or categories of authorisation. The WWTWs that are authorised 
                                                          
 
119
 Parliamentary question No. 1550 for written reply in the National Assembly, in 2009. Attached as 
Appendix A 
120
 In terms of definition 1(xxiv), NWA (1998) a ``watercourse'' means - (a) a river or spring; (b) a 
natural channel in which water flows regularly or intermittently; (c) a wetland, lake or dam into which, 
or from which, water flows; and (d) any collection of water which the Minister may, by notice in the 
Gazette, declare to be a watercourse, and a reference to a watercourse includes, where relevant, its 
bed and banks.  
121
 As per Regulation 991 of 1984. 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
are those that operate with valid water use licences, while those that are 
unauthorised operate without them or with licences that have expired. Of a total of 
1,293 WWTWs, only 468 (36%) operate legally under one of the authorisation types. 
 
Figure 2: Authorisation of Waste Water Treatment Works 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Authorisation Status of WWTW's
% not Authorized (None +
Expired)
 
 
Source: Smith L (2009) 14 (main source: DWAF, 2008a: 15) 
 
Figure 2 is a comparison of provincial WWTWs that shows the majority of waste 
water plants that are not authorised or with expired authorisation, which 
translates to high levels of non-compliance. This was during the initial stages of 
the establishment of the regulatory section of the then Department of Water 
Affairs in 2009. It provided baseline information towards the establishment of 
regulations for the water sector. 
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Table 1: Inventory of Waste Water Treatment Works authorisations 
Authorisation Type  WC EC KZN NC  FS NW GP  MP Lim Total 
None 73 96 168 60 106 43 29 60 53 688 
Exemption 2 69 23 23 38 10 23 24 0 212 
Permit  77 12 29 10 5 3 1 1 0 138 
GA 50 56 7 0 5 1 9 15 17 160 
Licence 16 3 5 4 7 9 19 17 15 95 
TOTAL WWTWs 218 236 232 97 161 66 81 117 85 1293 
Authorisation 
issued 
145 140 64 37 55 23 52 57 32 605 
Authorisation 
expired 
24 19 9 19 31 9 19 6 1 137 
Authorisation still 
valid 
121 121 55 18 24 14 33 51 31 468 
 TOTAL  WC EC KZ
N 
NC FS NW GP  MP Lim Total 
% Authorised 56 51 24 19 15 21 41 44 36 36% 
% not Authorised = 
(no WUL + Expired 
44 49 76 81 85 79 59 56 64 64% 
 
Source: Smith L (2009) 14 (main source: DWAF, 2008a: 15) 
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The situation is dire if 64% of 1293 WWTWs operate without any water use 
authorisation or with a licence that has expired. As can be seen in the table, above it 
may be that the licence has expired or the works does not comply with the conditions 
of the licence. Replying to a Parliamentary question,122 the Minister responsible for 
water affairs gave various reasons for municipalities not operating with the requisite 
water use licence. She said some municipalities simply do not apply for one, some do 
not meet the standard required for a licence and some do not have the capacity to 
complete the water use application form. Looking at the above table, the Minister was 
essentially telling the nation that the majority of waste water facilities are not even at 
the level of completing forms in terms of the skills they possess. The Minister was 
also implying that her Department was incapable of assisting the municipalities to 
complete the forms, as this is a kind of support expected from national government in 
terms of section 151(4) of the Constitution. It should, however, also be noted that the 
36% waste water plant that are recorded to be authorised and having a water use 
licences may not necessarily be compliant with the conditions of licence.  
 
The high levels of non-compliance could also be attributed to possible lack of 
inadequate or poor compliance monitoring and support expected from the DWS 
and/or a relevant sector department. This is a very unhealthy situation and definitely 
a cause for concern. 
 
A recent study by the University of Stellenbosch123 on the impacts that the polluted 
rivers have on food safety and human health reported that many South African rivers 
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 Question No 323 on 28 September 2009. 
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 TJ Britz, GO Sigge, N Huisamen, T Kikine, A Ackermann, M Lötter, C Lamprecht and M Kidd 
(2013). Reference to other published reports of Barnes and Taylor (2004); Germs et al (2004); Griesel 
and Jagals (2002); Olaniran et al (2009); Paulse et al (2009). 
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are unsuitable for irrigation of fresh produce. The study explains that this is mainly 
due to unacceptably high levels of faecal contamination124 that exceed the guideline 
limits set by the DWAF (1996) and World Health Organisation (WHO in 1989) for the 
irrigation of fresh produce. The study identifies informal settlements and the inability 
of municipalities to manage their waste water treatment works as primary sources of 
this pollution.  
 
The same conclusion was reached during the development of the second edition of 
National Water Resources Strategy (NWRS2). The NWRS2 concluded that, among 
other things, water resources experience ongoing pollution from various sources 
such as poor land use practices and effluent discharged from malfunctioning 
municipal waste water treatment works, resulting in ongoing problems with drinking 
water quality in a number of towns.125  
 
A general observation has been that the majority of WWTWs operate above their 
design capacity, leading to non-compliance with waste water discharge standards, 
thereafter damaging the water environmnet.126 This affects the security of supply, 
increasing pressure on the limited freshwater resources and raises the costs of water 
treatment and environmental rehabilitation.  
 
An integrated urban management approach is necessary for the urban water supply, 
which, according to Smith,127 is the fastest growing sector of national water use. The 
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 Pollution of water by human waste not suitable for especially for irrigation by the agricultural sector   
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 NWRS2 (2013) 37 and 72. 
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 NWRS2 (2013) 40 and NWSRS (2010) 13. 
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 Smith (2009) 5. 
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design capacity of many waste water works needs to be reviewed and resources 
allocated to their expansion in order to manage the demand for water that is 
increasing more rapidly than the population growth rate. Smith128 argues that the 
growing population has implications for waste water volumes rising significantly and 
this has implications both for water supply and waste water management, making 
provision of water more complex. This is evidenced by studies of water quality that 
identify informal settlements as significant contributors to the pollution of water 
resources. This further affects the primary task of municipalities providing safe, 
reliable and affordable water services and in a manner that promotes public health 
and does not pollute the environment.129  
 
Failing to balance water demand and projected water services in relation to 
population growth patterns is an indication of a failure to plan in terms of the water 
services development plans (WSDPs) as a means to integrate water plans with all 
other plans, especially the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs).  The IDP should 
facilitate the integration of government programmes for better implementation at local 
government level.130 The alignment of the WSDP and IDP is meant to facilitate 
integration of urban planning and water management131 which is necessary for the 
efficient management of waste water and effluent discharge. The WSDPs require the 
WSAs to indicate the status of existing water use, future projection of industrial water 
use, the extent of effluent disposed, as well as cost implications.132  
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 Smith (2009) 5. 
129
 Smith (2009) 9. 
130
 De Visser (2004) 219. 
131
 Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) (2013).  
132
 Sections 12, 18, 13(e) & (f) WSA (1997); NWRS2 (2013) 77 and 79; SFWS (2003) 43. 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
There is a view that the development of water services policy has outpaced the 
institutional capacity to implement it on the ground. The argument being advanced is 
that both the NWRS (a blueprint for water resources management) and the NWA set 
out ambitious policy standards that are appropriate for a developed world context.133 
The NWA and the NWRS are beyond the capacity of South Africa’s municipalities or 
the local government sphere. Powell makes reference to the review of the first term 
of local government (2000 to 2005) which pointed to a serious discrepancy between 
national policy objectives and the capacity of local government.134 This review 
attributed failure by local government to lack of support by national government to 
help municipalities discharge their responsibilities, among other things.135  
 
Again, the review of the impact of the IGRF Act in 2008 noted failure by municipalities 
in their core service delivery obligations provided for in sections 152 and 153 of the 
Constitution.136 This is a serious case of non-compliance and, if anything, any 
readjustment would have to start at the level of the Constitution. In his address during 
a policy debate to the National Council of Provinces,137 the Deputy Minister of 
CoGTA acknowledged that capability and effectiveness remain two critical challenges 
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 Smith (2009) and Hofmeyr (2012). 
134
 Powell (2012) 19. 
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 Powell (2012) 19.  
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 The Implementation of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act: An inaugural report 
(2005/06 – 2006/07) 49-50. 
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 Parliament RSA 8 October 2013.  
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for the state to address.138 He said that challenges of capacity constraints and 
weaknesses in governance and institutional performance inhibit improvement 
in performance and service delivery. If municipalities fail to plan in terms of the 
WSDPs and/or IDPs, which appears to be the case, it could be an indication that 
national government is failing in terms of its constitutional mandate to support and 
strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs. The latter 
situation, in turn, compromises the ability of municipalities to execute their 
functions.139  
 
Before tampering with the Constitution, Smith suggests that two things be 
examined.140 One is the possible reassessment of the capabilities of municipalities to 
determine if they cope with their functions as WSAs and water service providers. The 
second is whether the policies can be practically implemented whether the 
compliance they demand from municipalities is unrealistic. One could also add if 
spheres use the integrated planning approach as one of the critical requirements in 
delivering basic services for sustainable development. The National Spatial 
Development Perspective, Provincial Growth and Development Strategies and 
municipal Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) are the key planning tools that all 
spheres are expected to align with across government.141  
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 COGTA DM referred to the issues highlighted by the 2009 study on the State of Local Government, 
and the 2010 study commissioned on the State of Local Government Human Resources 
Development.  
139
 Sections 151(4) and 154(1), Constitution (1996).  
140
 Smith (2009) 13-16. 
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 DWAF Guide, (2005) 41, s153, Constitution, National Development Plan (2011) chap 5. 
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The Deputy Minister of the Department of Cooperative Government and Traditional 
Affaires (CoGTA spoke cautiously about the capability and effectiveness of the state 
and the challenges of capacity constraints and weaknesses that inhibit an 
improvement in performance and service delivery. One would support the latter 
sentiment that is concerned about the capacity of the state instead of the 
inefficiencies of one sphere of government. Despite all the tools available for support, 
the national and provincial departments responsible for local government are failing 
in their crucial role of ensuring that there is co-ordination between departments 
around matters affecting local government.142  
 
3.3.1 Statistical evidence of non-compliance by municipalities and government  
 
The Green Drop certification programme and the municipal strategic self-assessment 
(MuSSA) initiative are the two processes which the DWS uses to track and or monitor 
progress with compliance of municipalities in relation to water services provision. 
These will be discussed in this section. 
 
3.3.1.1 The Green Drop audit report143 
In an effort to manage water quality in South Africa, the then DWA, (now DWS)  
instituted the Blue Drop (BD) and Green Drop (GD) certification programmes to give 
assurance to the South African public about the good management of drinking water 
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 De Visser (2000) 22. 
143
 Institutions that have been identified to own and manage waste water systems that reside in critical 
state and display exceptional poor performance are indicated with a ‘Purple Drop’ in the Green Drop 
Report 2013. Such WSIs are required to provide the DWA with a Corrective Action Plan within 30 days 
of notice of these results (Green Drop scores <30%). 
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quality and waste water quality, respectively. These are incentive-based water quality 
regulation programmes aimed at helping municipalities comply with the prescribed 
norms and standards for the protection of consumers and water resources.  
 
The DWS uses the GD certification programme to provide the regulatory support to 
municipalities and facilitate the provision of safe and reliable water services in a 
manner that promotes public health and does not pollute the environment.144 The GD 
is an incentive-based regulatory support mechanism that encourages effective and 
efficient management of waste water treatment and effluent discharge, and ensures 
efficient implementation of regulations at local government level. Promoting 
transparency, providing reliable and consistent information to the public on waste 
water treatment and effluent discharge is necessary in the context of a democracy 
like South Africa. The WSA145 and SFWS require municipalities to provide 
information concerning the provision of water services. This information is then made 
available to all government spheres and citizens for the assurance of an adequate 
and safe water supply. In 2008, the DWS embarked on a Green Drop audit process 
to receive and manage the information supplied on a monthly basis by the water 
services authorities, and to monitor the accuracy and reliability of this information.146 
The Green Drop certification programme is thus an initiative to promote good 
performance in the treatment of effluent and the management of effluent discharge 
quality.147 
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As Table 2 below reflects, the purpose of the DG certification programme is to 
identify and develop core competencies required for the sector to sustainably 
improve the level of waste water management.148  
 
Table 2: Core competencies evaluated in relation to WWTWs and respective weighting 
No. Key Performance Area Weight 
1. Process Control & Maintenance Skills 10% 
2. Monitoring Programme 15% 
3. Submission of Results 5% 
4. Effluent Quality Compliance 30% 
5 Risk Management 15% 
6 Local Regulation 5% 
7. Treatment Capacity 5% 
8. Asset Management 15% 
 Source: 2013 Green Drop Surveillance Report, DWA  
 
The effluent quality compliance stands out as a priority core competence and its risk 
out-weighs and doubles all other core competences. Hence it is prioritised in the 
regulation strategy of the DWS (2010 NWSRS).  
 
The BD and DG water quality certification programmes were implemented in 2009 
when the DWS started focusing on its regulatory function. As noted above, the 
statistics reflecting the poor state of waste water treatment systems served as a 
baseline for subsequent monitoring by the DWS It was noted in 2010 that pollution 
from waste water treatment plants managed by both municipalities and the private 
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sector has become a major concern in South Africa as most WWTWs had exceeded 
their design capacity and were overloaded.149 
 
According to the Green Drop reports150 the performance of municipalities in 
managing the waste water works has been declining over the years. Out of a total of 
821 WWTWs managed by 156 municipalities, in 2009 / 2010 financial year 444 
WWTWs in 98 municipalities were assessed and 49% of these scored less than 50%. 
In 2010/2011 financial year 821 WWTWs in 56 municipalities were assessed and 
44% scored less than 50% indicating a drop in performance compared to the 
2009/2010 results. In 2012/13 all waste water systems managed by government 
(Local Government and the Department of Public Works) were assessed and  a 
performance of WWTWs declined dramatically to less than 30% GD scores. Out of a 
total of 942 WWTWs, 352 scored less than 30% (see tables 3 and 4 below)  
 
Tables 3 and 4 below, taken and adapted from the 2013-2014 Green Drop report, 
show that there is no coordination between local government and national 
government (Department of Public Works). However, Table 3 shows that plants 
managed by WSAs are more closely monitored and have performed better than 
plants managed by the Department of Public Works, which are reflected in Table 4.  
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Table 3: Provinces/WSAs with Green Drop scores below 30% 
Province Number WWTW with <30% 
score 
Percentage of WWTW with <30% 
score 
Gauteng  None 0% 
Western Cape 9  5.7% 
KwaZulu-Natal 32  22.7% 
Eastern Cape 34  27.4% 
Free State 46  49.5% 
Northern Cape 33  41.8% 
Limpopo 32  55.2% 
North West 21  56.8% 
Mpumalanga 41  53.9% 
National overview 248  30.1% 
Source: 2013/14 Green Drop Surveillance Report dated 25 September 2013. 
 
Table 4 below reflects serious mismanagement by the Department of Public Works. 
Looking at the two tables, it can also be concluded that there is lack of coordination 
between national and local government which adversely affects service delivery. 
 
Table 4: DPW-managed WWTW with Green Drop scores below 30% 
DPW Regions and Cities Number of WWTWs 
with <30% core 
Percentage of WWTWs 
with <30% score 
North West (Mmabatho) All 10 plants  100% 
Gauteng (Johannesburg) 1 plant  100% 
Gauteng (Pretoria) All 8 plants  100% 
Eastern Cape (Umtata) All 18 plants  100% 
Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth) All 11 plants  100% 
Free State (Bloemfontein) All 8 plants  100% 
Limpopo (Polokwane) All 17 plants  100% 
Northern Cape (Kimberly)  4 of 6 plants  67% 
KwaZulu-Natal (North and South) 16 of 19 plants  84% 
Mpumalanga (Nelspruit) 8 of 11 plants  73% 
Western Cape (Cape Town) 3 of 12 plants  25% 
DPW National Overview 104 of 121 plants  86% 
Source: 2013/14 Green Drop Surveillance Report dated 25 September 2013. 
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The 30 per cent Green Drop score is an indication of non-compliance with the 
regulatory requirements and these plants are at a ‘critical risk’ rating151 and as such 
qualify for regulatory surveillance ) in accordance the WSA.152 
 
3.3.1.2 Municipal Strategic Self-Assessment (MuSSA) Report  
 
The Municipal Strategic Self-Assessment programme is a process that was initiated 
by the then Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) in 2006 to determine 
the overall business health of a municipality. The programme entails tracking current 
and likely future performance as well as identifying key areas of vulnerability in a 
municipality. The MuSSA report serves as a source of information on municipal 
performance and a guide for municipalities to effectively plan and appropriately direct 
resources to targeted key performance areas such as the management of effluent 
discharge in the WWTWs. The MuSSA process facilitates for the DWS and the sector 
to provide more effective support to local government. The 2013 MuSSA process 
identified sixteen key business health attributes through which to track performance 
of municipalities.153 An important aspect of the MuSSA process is that municipalities 
                                                          
 
151
 90-100%: Excellent situation, maintain via continued improvement; 80-<90%: Good, improve where 
gaps identified to move to excellent; 50-<80%: Fair, ample room for improvement; 31-<50%: Very 
poor, need targeted intervention towards gradual sustainable improvement; 0-<31%: Critical state, 
need urgent intervention for all aspects of the waste water services business.  
152
 Sections 62 and 63, Water Services Act (1997) on Monitoring and intervention of water services 
authorities. 
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 1. Water Services Development Planning; 2. Management Skill Level; 3. Staff Skill Levels; 4. 
Technical Staff Capacity; 5. Water Resource Management; 6. Water Conservation and Demand 
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assess themselves and determine their own level of performance,154 and this should 
make it easy to determine appropriate support programmes.155  
Table 5: Vulnerability indexes of key business health attributes nationally 
No. Key Business Health Attribute Vulnerability 
Index
156
 
1. Water Services Development Planning 70% 
2. Management Skill Level 80% 
3. Staff Skill Levels 90% 
4. Technical Staff Capacity 65% 
5. Water Resource Management  85% 
6. Water Conservation and Demand Management 70% 
7. Drinking Water Safety and Blue Drop Status  85% 
8. Waste water / Environmental Safety / Green Drop 85% 
9. Infrastructure Asset Management 25% 
10. Operation and Maintenance of Assets 75% 
11.. Financial Management  70% 
12. Revenue Collection  60% 
13. Information Management 90% 
14 Organisational Performance  100% 
15. Water Service Quality  70% 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Safety/Green Drop; 9. Infrastructure Asset Management; 10. Operation and Maintenance of Assets; 
11. Financial Management; 12. Revenue Collection; 13.Information Management; 14.Organisational 
Performance; 15. Water Service Quality and 16. Customer Care. 
154
 In terms of Chapter 6 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (2000), municipalities are 
expected to establish, develop, audit, review and report on their respective internal performance 
management systems. 
155
 SFWS (2003) 60. 
156
 Very high vulnerability index: 0-50%; high vulnerability index: 50-60%; medium vulnerability index: 
60-75%; low vulnerability index: 75-100%.  
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16. Customer Care 80% 
Source: 2012 Municipal Services Strategic Assessment (MuSSA) for South Africa dated 2013 
 
The two critical business health attributes that are of interest for this research are 
water services development planning (WSDP) and the waste water / environmental 
safety (listed as the first and eighth attributes) as these relate specifically to the 
management of waste water treatment works. Although the scores of 70 per cent and 
85 per cent equate to a low vulnerability index (see footnote 155 below), these are 
not satisfactory national scores for an area of water quality which threatens both 
human life and the life of the ecosystem. 
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Table 6: Municipal Vulnerability Index performance per province157 
Province  Total 
no. of 
WSAs 
Very High 
vulnerability  
High 
vulnerability  
Moderate 
vulnerability  
Low 
vulnerability  
No. of 
WSAs 
% No. of 
WSAs 
% No. of 
WSAs 
% No. of 
WSA
s 
% 
EC 16 8 50% 4 25% 3 19% 1 6% 
FS 20 10 50% 7 35% 3 15% 0 0% 
GP 10 1 10% 6 60% 3 30% 0 0% 
KZN 14 3 21% 7 50% 4 29% 0 0% 
Limpopo  11 7 64% 4 36% 0 0% 0 0% 
MP 18 12 67% 3 17% 3 17% 0 0% 
NC 27 16 59% 10 37% 0 0% 1 4% 
NW 11 9 82% 1 9% 1 9% 0 0% 
WC 25 4 16% 8 32% 10 40% 3 12% 
TOTAL 152 70 46% 50 33% 27 18% 5 3% 
Source: 2012 Municipal Services Strategic Assessment (MuSSA) for South Africa 
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Table 6 above reflects very high vulnerability indexes of the majority of the WWTWs, 
that is, 120 of 152 WWTWs are within the categories of very high and high 
vulnerability index, which is an indication that the risk has significantly increased.  
 
If one looks at municipal compliance and institutional performance between 
2009/2010 and the 2013/14 financial years, one sees no improvement. Rather, what 
emerges is a worsening situation with regard to municipalities performing their 
constitutional functions. The latter situation prevails despite the many interventions 
that have been effected through section 139 of the Constitution. Thompson158 argues 
that intervention should not only be in terms of allocation of resources but through a 
coordinated and cooperative approach to monitoring the local sphere that should 
bring about the successful implementation of government policy.  
 
3.4  Ensuring compliance and promoting performance  
 
Thompson159 argues  that the mere existence of the law does not ensure compliance 
but consists of provisions which impose obligations or prohibitions or entrust certain 
powers in individuals and organisations. In the context of cooperative governance, 
the role of national and provincial governments is not only to ensure that the local 
government sphere complies but it is also for them to comply with their respective 
mandates of water services provision as per the WSA. It is both a constitutional and 
legislative mandate for the provincial and national spheres to support the local 
sphere, to ensure compliance and promote performance.160 This point is also 
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emphasised by De Visser161 who argues that despite the competency of the two 
spheres to enact legislation to be implemented at local government level, they are 
still expected to comply with section 154(1) of the Constitution with regard to 
supporting the local government sphere, lest they be found guilty of compromising 
the ability of municipalities to comply.162 The cooperative governance support by the 
provincial and national government spheres to local government should ensure that 
local government is self-regulating and accountable, among other things.163  
 
National and provincial governments are expected to balance their mandates to 
support local government and regulate their functions to realise policy objectives and 
comply with norms and standards.164 The regulatory approach should avoid 
mechanisms that may be unconstitutional and undermine the institutional integrity of 
local government.165 Monitoring is a constitutionally and legislatively prescribed 
mechanism that should be used for support and regulatory functions without 
undermining the institutional integrity of local government.166 Monitoring other 
spheres and intervening when there is a failure to perform a function is an integral 
part of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations.167 It is an essential 
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tool of effective support and regulation as it helps to identify instances where 
interventions are needed to protect the public interest.168  
 
The WSA169 provides for the National and provincial governments to monitor all water 
services institutions to ensure compliance with prescribed norms and standards for 
water service provision and tariffs for improved water sector performance. This 
support is important because if it is not provided, the entire management of the water 
value chain is affected. The water sector planning at the level of water services 
authorities has implications for water service providers and intermediaries.170 In terms 
of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (Systems Act),171 CoGTA and 
National Treasury have a coordinating role to play to ensure that service delivery and 
the fiscal plans of municipalities are aligned with those of national and provincial 
sector departments. The Minister responsible for local government is empowered by 
the Systems Act172 to make regulations or issue guidelines to put in place 
mechanisms and procedures for the coordination and integration of sectoral 
requirements and the manner in which municipalities must comply. 
 
A sustainable approach to ensuring compliance by municipalities is to strengthen 
government-wide support to municipalities and not only focus on municipal 
performance. Eddy’s173 approach of taking away the regulation of industrial 
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dischargers from municipalities and for these to be regulated at national government 
level is not sustainable. This approach is not in the interest of sustainable service 
delivery, nor does it strengthen cooperative governance. It is an approach that 
contradicts the constitutional provision for provincial and national government to 
support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs and 
exercise their own powers and functions.174  
 
An initiative by CoGTA to develop the Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support and 
Intervention Bill175 (IMSI Bill) will go a long way in improving compliance by 
municipalities. The focus of the IMSI Bill is not only on local government, it also 
addresses capacity challenges of national and provincial spheres in supporting, 
monitoring and intervening in municipalities.176 The Deputy Minister of CoGTA 
announced plans to strengthen municipal planning support through the development 
and implementation of the Revised IDP Framework. The IMSI initiative will guide 
sector integration and facilitate mechanisms linking planning, budgeting, 
implementation, monitoring and reporting for integrated planning and reporting. This 
will further strengthen the local sphere of government. Establishing national IDP 
support teams constituted of national and provincial sector departments to focus on 
giving support to municipalities is also envisioned. As already alluded to above, 
further barriers to compliance are caused by lack of financial resources and different 
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departments demanding different deliverables, the latter as a result of uncoordinated 
planning and reporting processes.177  
 
To return to Thompson’s argument, all three spheres have an obligation imposed by 
the law for the successful implementation of South Africa’s water regulatory laws and 
regulations. Compliance by all spheres of government in relation to their respective 
responsibilities would facilitate compliance by municipalities.178  
 
This thesis supports a view that sees the key objective of any intergovernmental 
relations mechanism as informed by, among other things, the need to support local 
government and for government to work as a single unit.179 The duty to monitor and 
regulate the water management function needs to be informed by the compliance 
requirements expected from municipalities. Adopting the integrated approach would 
be much more prudent than, for example, the approach suggested by Smith180 of 
reviewing the decentralised model of service provision mandated by the 1996 
Constitution.  
 
3.5  Conclusion 
 
This chapter’s examination of statistical data on municipal compliance brought to light 
consistent and significant non-compliance by municipalities with national norms and 
standards of effluent discharge. Many municipalities do not adhere to their legal 
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obligation to provide water services in an equitable and sustainable manner, and are 
failing in their duty to promote a healthy, safe and pollution free environment.  
 
As highlighted above, the WSA and the NWA are the two key pieces of legislation 
that regulate water in South Africa. They both acknowledge and provide for different 
spheres of government as well as other stakeholders to participate in the 
management of water services and water resources, respectively. The preamble to 
the WSA acknowledges the role of all spheres of government to cooperatively ensure 
the provision of water supply and sanitation services in an equitable and sustainable 
manner. The NWA requirement to set up institutions to decentralise the water 
resources management function is an indication that cooperation between different 
spheres of government and their respective entities is inevitable. Both national and 
provincial spheres of government have the constitutional and legislative obligation to 
monitor performance of local government, provide support and strengthen its 
capacity to execute its functions. There are statutory mechanisms provided by the 
Constitution and legislation which the national and provincial spheres of government 
are mandated to use in facilitating municipal compliance. One of the ways would be 
to ensure that policies with corresponding regulations are practical and 
implementable at local government level. This could be achieved through 
coordinated and integrated planning and reporting: and the alignment of the IDPs 
and WSDPs would provide such coordination. 
 
Addressing the challenge of non-compliance in local government implementation is 
not the responsibility of municipalities alone, but one which all three spheres of 
government should share. The next chapter examines the different support and 
regulatory mechanisms that the DWS uses to enforce compliance by municipalities. 
Cooperative government will also be examined as one of the mechanisms to be used 
in this regard. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
 
MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCING COMPLIANCE BY 
MUNICIPALITIES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
How should DWS address the problem of enforcing compliance by municipalities with 
national prescribed norms and standards for the management of waste water quality 
or effluent discharge? This chapter explores the different enforcement mechanisms 
that can be used to ensure compliance by municipalities with national norms and 
standards for the management of effluent discharge. There are legally prescribed, 
punitive measures that criminalise the act of pollution, and they apply to all polluters 
irrespective of the person or facility responsible for it. The Constitution and legislation 
also provide punitive actions which the national government can take against non-
compliant municipalities. In addition, there are less punitive non-legal measures that 
can be used to encourage cooperation by municipalities.  
 
4.2  Enforcement  
 
Enforcement is a set of actions the regulator takes in response to detected non-
compliance and to demand that the transgressor, in this case the polluter, presents a 
corrective action that ensures the rehabilitation and further protection of a water 
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resource in question and the affected consumers.181 Both the national and local 
government spheres have the responsibility to enforce regulations within the water 
sector. The decentralised regulatory authority of local government complements that 
of national government.182 The DWS enforces regulations in relation to the different 
water uses provided for in Section 21(a)-(k) of the NWA, while local government 
enforces regulations concerning all aspects of water services provision through by-
laws 183 as well as socio-economic regulation, such as investments and the setting of 
tariffs.184 
 
There are consequences and remedies when a user and a consumer fails to comply 
with, respectively, water use conditions and water services contractual obligations. 
For instance, municipalities have the power to cut off the water and/or reduce the 
flow if there is failure by the consumer to comply with conditions set for the provision 
of water services.185 As indicated in Chapter 2  above (in footnote 79 above),  the two 
key pieces of legislation for water management (the NWA and WSA) and consistently 
with the other Acts of Parliament, make non-compliance by all water users, including 
all organs of state,186 a criminal offence. Section 151(2) of the NWA provides that any 
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person who is responsible for pollution, contravenes or fails to comply with 
authorisation187  
is guilty of an offence and liable, on the first conviction, to a fine or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or to both a fine and such 
imprisonment and, in the case of a second or subsequent conviction, to a fine 
or imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or to both a fine and such 
imprisonment. 
 
The promulgation of the NWA followed that of the WSA, and the latter provision 
reiterates the sentiments of section 82 of the WSA, which make pollution of a water 
resource a punishable offence in terms of which a polluter qualifies for prosecution 
and conviction. Although the 1956 Water Act was notorious for not allocating water 
equitably, was biased towards agriculture and industry, and did not pay attention to 
the impact of human activities on water resources, it did make pollution, 
contraventions or failure to comply with the provisions of the Act a punishable 
offence. The Health Act188 63 of 1977 and the National Health Act 61 of 2003 impose 
criminal sanctions on a municipality that fails to provide safe potable water to citizens 
and for violating a constitutional right to a pollution-free environment or engaging in 
activities that affect the health of people.189  
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More importantly, these punitive measures for non-compliance were endorsed by 
local government legislation190 which makes non-compliance by municipalities with 
municipal by-laws, regulations and all other legislation administered by municipalities 
a prosecutable offence.191 
 
4.3. Statutory mechanisms for enforcing compliance by municipalities  
 
Both national and local government legislation prescribe some remedies to apply 
when municipalities fail in their provision of basic services. The NWA and the WSA 
empower the Minister to use criminal, administrative and civil measures to direct all 
water users to discontinue activities that transgress the provisions of the water sector 
regulations.192 The Constitution and local government legislation also prescribe a 
number of mechanisms to force municipalities to comply with their service-delivery 
mandate.  
 
4.3.1 Criminal measures  
As indicated above, section 151(2) of the NWA makes it an offence to pollute the 
water resources, making reference especially to section 19 of the NWA. It is also a 
criminal offence to fail to comply with directives issued in terms of sections 20 (on 
Control of emergency incidents), 53 (on contravention of the provisions of NWA or 
failure to comply with authorisation conditions) and 118 (on control measures for dam 
with safety risk). Although the criminalisation of pollution and contraventions in the 
NWA, WSA and the Health Act is not based on stiff fines, the civil order (section 153 
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of the NWA and section 82 of the WSA) requires the accused to pay the actual costs 
of rehabilitating the water environment.193 The main aim of criminal prosecution is to 
force the the polluter to rehabilitate the water environment in question, whether in 
cash or kind, and to commit to reversing the possible violations of the rights of the 
affected communities by an act of pollution. The polluter-pays and/or prosecution 
enforcement tool can be very expensive for both the polluter and the regulator as the 
latter has to take responsibility to the rehabilitation in the event that the polluter is not 
able to do so. The polluter or the transgressor then pays back. On the positive side, it 
can be a highly effective enforcement tool, given its value as a deterrent. If convicted 
and prosecuted, a person can have his or her authorisation cancelled, and he or she 
can be suspended and blacklisted for a period of time.194  
 
4.3.2 Administrative measures 
 
The NWA, WSA and NEMA afford public authorities power to use administrative 
enforcement measures to enforce compliance without approaching the courts or use 
the litigation process.195 The responsible authority communicates non-compliance 
using monitoring reports, site visit inspection reports and directives to alert the water 
services authorities (WSAs) of detected or looming non-compliance. The 
administrative measures allow for the recipient of the non-compliance notice or 
directive an opportunity to rectify the violation or put measures in place to prevent a 
potential violation. These measures are always in the spirit of cooperative 
governance and are popular in the DWS system of enforcement. If there is no 
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response or the response to notices and directives is inadequate, the DWS or any 
other department whose regulations have been contravened, can escalate the matter 
for prosecution and this would trigger a section 151(2) prosecution process.  
 
4.3.3 Civil measures 
 
The Minister responsible for mater management is empowered by the NWA196 to 
apply for a high court mandatory interdict, to either direct a person to stop polluting or 
order a person to clean up the effects of pollution. These are applicable in situations 
that need urgent interventions.197  
 
4.3.4 Measures to stop funding  
 
The Constitution and the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA) 
make non-compliance to the prescribed finance measures punishable. National 
Treasury may stop the transfer of funds where municipalities consistently commit a 
serious breach of financial management measures.198 The Systems Act requires a 
cabinet member to initiate legislation making it the responsibility of a municipality to 
build its capacity and provide sufficient funding. Providing funding can also be a 
sanction, as the WSA199 empowers the Minister to refuse financial assistance to a 
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water services institution which fails to comply with its constitutional or any 
obligations in terms of any law.  
An attempted prosecution of Stellenbosch local municipality is a case in point. 
Stellenbosch local municipality was allocated Regional Bulk Infrastructure Grant 
(RBIG) funding, but the funds had to be withdrawn after they were not utilised over a 
financial year. The municipality ignored complaints dating back in 1993 about the 
quality of water from the polluted Eerste river not being suitable for irrigation as well 
as incidents of diarrhea among the population. The many directives from the then 
DWA were also ignored until the department sought relief and used section 53(2)(b) 
of the NWA to request the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to prosecute.200 The 
NPA turned down the request for prosecution and instructed the DWA and 
Stellenbosch local municipality to resolve the issue using cooperative government 
processes.  
 
Although the national and provincial spheres have a constitutional obligation to 
support and capacitate municipalities, this does not absolve local government from 
complying with their service provision functions in an efficient manner.201 Although 
the process of stopping the funds is clearly spelt out in section 216 of the 
Constitution, it may lead to a dispute and disrupt the provision of services. The 
Constitution instructs the spheres to avoid courts and exhaust the processes of 
cooperative government to resolve the dispute. In the case of a dispute involving 
local government and/or a municipality, the provisions of the MFMA202 are applicable.  
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4.4 Non-statutory mechanisms for enforcing compliance by municipalities  
 
A fundamental characteristic of all enforcement programmes is that there is no one-
size-fits-all solution to compliance and enforcement challenges. The appropriate 
approach is to adopt and use an optimal mix of enforcement tools to suit specific 
conditions for an efficient and effective enforcement regime.203 The prescribed 
enforcement measures that have been unpacked above are not enforceable on 
municipalities. The enforcement principles therefore require innovative measures that 
encourage compliance, or readiness to comply, on the part of the regulated. The 
appropriate approach for municipalities is thus to explore alternative measures that 
promote compliance.204  
 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)205 established an 
International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE) for 
the purpose of dealing with compliance and enforcement by organs of state.206 
INECE compiled a list of principles which avoid sanctions, civil and criminal 
processes but which promote and encourage alternative compliance and 
enforcement processes especially applicable to organs of state. Such informal, 
alternative measures do not have enforcement as their primary objective; the focus is 
instead on better management of water resources for sustainable provision of water 
services.  
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Eddy argues that this approach is not consistent with the principles of enforcement, 
which require taking a similar approach in similar circumstances to achieve similar 
ends. The reality is that transgression by a government entity is not different from that 
of a private person, but the variables that inform decision-making certainly are, and 
require a degree of discretion.207 The use of alternative enforcement measures also 
encourages the private sector to partner and cooperate with the state,208 especially 
so because it saves costs and also benefits both the state and individuals.209 The 
alternative enforcement measures have been extensively used with about 300 
negotiated environmental compliance agreements in Europe; 30,000 pollution control 
agreements entered into in Japan, and over 40 voluntary programmes administered 
at the federal level in the United States of America.210  
 
The application of statutory enforcement mechanisms to municipalities has far-
reaching implications in terms of providing equitable access to basic services. The 
avoidance of litigation as a tool to force municipalities to comply is aimed at serving 
the public interest.  
 
4.4.1 Common Law measures 
The common law provides tried and trusted remedies that can be resorted to in the 
event of failure of legally prescribed remedies.211 The basis of the common-law-
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based measures is the duty of care principle provided for by NEMA. It requires a 
person responsible for pollution to take responsibility for the return of the degraded or 
polluted environment to its original state.212 NEMA and the NWA also provide for the 
responsible authority to take measures it considers necessary to remedy the 
situation.213  
 
The duty of care provision allows any person to use sections 28(12) and 28(7) of 
NEAM for a court order forcing a person who, respectively, has caused pollution or 
degradation of the environment or the responsible authority, to take corrective 
measures to rehabilitate the environment and to compensate the affected 
communities, if any. In this case, it is not only the municipality that is seen to be non-
compliant but the responsible authority as well. The common law measures allow the 
members of the public, as individuals or as civic groups, to seek relief using section 
28(12) of NEMA. The NWA has decentralised water resource management providing 
for the establishment of Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) which in turn 
have a duty to facilitate the establishment of Water forums such as Water Users 
Associations (WUAs) and catchment management forums.214 Consistent with the 
vision of developmental local government framework for communities to find 
sustainable solutions to their needs and improve the quality of their lives, such 
forums have a duty to monitor and report non-compliant facilities or individuals. This 
increases public awareness and puts pressure on the regulated facilities (in this 
context, the municipalities) to comply.  
 
                                                          
 
212
 Sections 19(2)(e) NWA (1998, 2 and 28 NEMA (1998). 
213
 Section 19(4) NWA (1998) and section 28(7) NEMA (1998). 
214
 Established in terms of chaps 7 and 8, NWA (1998).  
 
 
 
 
78 
 
4.4.2  Incentive-based measures  
According to the White Paper on water policy,215 the use of economic incentives and 
penalties should be used as an option for water quality management. The Green 
Drop and Blue Drop certification programmes were developed by the then DWA to 
facilitate an incentive-based regulatory approach in an attempt to encourage 
municipalities to comply with norms and standards to manage the WWTWs. Through 
the Blue Drop Green and Drop programme, municipalities are encouraged and 
assisted to comply with regulations that aim to improve the quality of drinking water 
and waste water, respectively. These operate on a system of incentives and 
penalties as a way of encouragement. The Green Drop system approach focuses on 
sustainable water pollution management and prevention of possibly irreversible 
environmental degradation resulting from pollution.216 The statistical evidence of 
municipal non-compliance, in Chapter 3 above, is based on the Green Drop scores, 
which indicate failure by municipalities to comply with Green Drop requirements. As a 
name-and-shame measurer, the Blue/Green Drop certification programmes have not 
assisted or encouraged the water services authorities to comply.  
 
4.5 Barriers to enforcement  
 
From 2009, the aim of the DWS has been to streamline its constitutional support 
obligations local government based on section 154(1) and focus more on its authority 
to regulate municipalities in terms of section 155(7) of the Constitution. The DWS 
believes that the regulatory role in terms of section 155(7) is its ‘core business’ in 
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protecting the water resources  and it does not  have to provide evidence of its 
support prior to taking punitive action in instances of municipal non-compliance.217  
 
This change of focus has been effected through the process of updating the National 
Water Resources Strategy (NWRS), which sets out strategies, objectives, plans, 
guidelines and procedures for water resources management.218 The NWRS1219 
established the water sector Skills Development Task Team for sector skills 
development training and education. This was the mandate of the WSLG to facilitate 
development and support for the water sector.220 The NWRS2 shifted focus from 
supporting to giving more emphasis to regulating the water sector, assuming a 
stronger enforcement stance. However, given the challenges outlined above of 
deteriorating levels of compliance, streamlining support for a stronger enforcement 
role is not yet feasible, one can argue, for both the municipalities and the DWS.221  
 
It is also particularly difficult for the DWS to enforce compliance by municipalities as it 
has no direct relationship with the water services authorities outside sections 154(1) 
and 155(7) of the Constitution to support and regulate.222 Powell’s argument for the 
need to re-examine and reshape intergovernmental policy in the wake of the 
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promulgation of local government laws succeeding the water laws223 is especially 
relevant insofar as this will involve intervening in local government to resolve water-
related service delivery challenges. The WSA and the Constitution outline a process 
of when and how intervention should happen if a water services authority is unable to 
perform its functions.224 Such powers are given to the MECs for local government 
while the Minister responsible for water management only assumes responsibility if 
the MEC has unjustifiably failed to intervene or has failed to intervene effectively.225  
 
One would support a proposal to review section 63 of the WSA on intervention and 
improve its effectiveness by allowing the Minister responsible for water to intervene 
directly to resolve water-related challenges. Considering the high priority given to 
access to basic services, it makes practical sense for the Minister responsible for 
water management to have the power to directly respond to particular challenges and 
not wait for the provincial government to fail.226 As it appears in the water value chain 
(Figure 1), the provincial government sphere is not part of the water value chain and 
would not add any value in the process of intervention for resolving water 
management issues. Steytler’s view that the administrative role of provincial 
government does not add value and unnecessarily drags processes227 is especially 
true in matters of water governance. The key responsibilities of water governance lie 
with national and local governments and should not be unnecessarily widely shared 
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to avoid prolonged consultation and consensus-seeking processes which sometimes 
lead to accountability getting obscured.228  
 
Figure 3 below further illustrates this point. The provincial government sphere is not 
even part of the accountability process of local government and does not get the 
statutory reports from the local government to the national sphere. The key regulatory 
stakeholders are national departments, including CoGTA for local government 
regulation, the DWS for water services regulation, and the National Treasury for 
financial regulation. 
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Figure 3: Regulatory reporting lines and information-sharing for water services sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Water Services Regulation Strategy (2010) page 36
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The process to designate water services authorities is another policy gap that needs 
to be reviewed as it is important for the Minister responsible for water to have a role. 
Currently, the role to identify and designate municipalities as water services 
authorities is the prerogative of the national and provincial departments responsible 
for local government. If the DWS is responsible for setting and regulating national 
norms and standards for water services, it makes sense to have a role in determining 
the criteria to assess the capabilities of municipalities to be WSAs. This is one of the 
twelve policy proposals towards the amendment of the NWA and WSA that were 
approved by Cabinet at the end of 2013. The DWS proposes to provide technical 
input in the criteria being used to designate and appoint local municipalities as 
WSAs.229 This may be encroaching on the institutional integrity of local government 
which, according to De Visser, should be avoided.230 However, it is a necessary 
approach for better coordination and cooperation for effective participation of local 
government in water management programmes.231  
 
The IDP process is key to making sure that there is coordination of implementation at 
local government level. Algotsson and Murombo232 raise a valid point when they 
argue that lack of corresponding statutory sanction for the process of IDP is a serious 
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policy gap. This hinders the effective management of the WSDP process, which is 
crucial to integrated water resource management.  
 
The above policy gaps confirm the argument that the NWA provides little in the way 
of regulatory procedures, standards and tools, describing the NWA as an enabling 
piece of legislation that provides no tools for enforcement.233 The Minister of CoGTA 
announced the possibility of drafting legislation that forces municipalities to comply 
with existing laws and regulations.234 The Minister can do this by invoking the 
provisions of the Systems Act235 which empower the Minister responsible for local 
government to make regulations for the coordination and integration of sectoral 
requirements and the manner in which municipalities must comply. Another more 
prudent approach would be for the Minister to coordinate with other relevant sector 
departments and force all spheres of government to comply with the IGRF legislation 
and agree on collaborative processes and procedures to streamline governance.236  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
A wide array of enforcement measures are available to the state, but significant 
policy gaps and limitations hamper their enforcement. The fact that the Minister 
responsible for the management of water does not have discretion to respond directly 
and with immediate effect to water-related crisis situations is one such obstacle. The 
absence of a statutory relationship also makes it difficult to effectively facilitate the 
alignment of municipal integrated development plans (IDP) with the water services 
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development plans (WSDPs) as the basis for effective management of the water 
value-chain. To maintain this focus, a direct line of communication between the DWS 
and municipalities is necessary.  
 
Neither the statutory nor the informal enforcement measures have proven to be 
useful and effective tools in enforcing compliance by municipalities. The next chapter 
examines how the principles of cooperative government and intergovernmental 
relations could be used, not as enforcement mechanisms but as measures to 
address problems that make enforcement necessary before they become a crisis. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
 
TOWARDS ENHANCING COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE 
IN THE WATER SECTOR 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The onus to protect water resources and ensure the constitutional rights of people to 
a pollution-free environment rests on all spheres of government. The Constitution and 
legislation provide for provincial government to rehabilitate the environmental 
degradation (including a water resource which is a receiving environment) caused by 
the act of pollution, should a municipality fail to do so. If the provincial government 
also fails, national government or the responsible authority is required to assume 
responsibility to the extent necessary to maintain essential national standards or 
meet established minimum standards.  
 
This chapter explores the principles of cooperative government in terms of how they 
can assist the DWS to effectively monitor and strengthen its enforcement programme 
in relation to municipalities and other organs of state. In particular, the 
intergovernmental relations forums and the Implementation Protocols are examined 
as measures that can facilitate an effective compliance and enforcement programme 
for municipalities.  
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5.2.  Cooperative government  
 
The Constitution describes South Africa as constituted of national, provincial and 
local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.237 
Each sphere is politically autonomous but is expected to cooperate with the other 
spheres and exercise its autonomy to the benefit of all citizens and the country.238 
The elements of distinctiveness, interdependence and interrelatedness emphasise 
cooperation in terms of functional responsibilities of spheres rather than the degree of 
political autonomy.239 The three spheres of government are constitutionally mandated 
to observe and apply the principles of cooperative government and 
intergovernmental relations in executing their respective public functions.240  
 
As already indicated in Chapter 2, national government (the DWS) has a concurrent 
and/or an overlapping water management functional relationship with local 
government and concurrent competence with provincial governments for the 
management of the environment and pollution. To ensure that local government 
(water services authorities) is able to provide access to clean, potable water for 
domestic, agricultural and industrial use,241 national government (DWS) must develop 
water infrastructure resources to meet water supply (and sanitation) services.242 Both 
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the national and provincial government spheres have a duty to support local 
government for municipalities to effectively perform their functions and manage their 
own affairs.243 It is therefore inevitable that the three spheres should cooperate to 
ensure that service delivery is not compromised by local government not complying 
with national norms and standards for policy implementation. This demands 
intergovernmental relations structures or processes that are strategically positioned 
to enable government, as a collective, to respond to service delivery challenges.  
 
The IGRF Act requires all spheres of government to facilitate coordination in the 
implementation of policy and legislation for effective provision of services and to 
efficiently monitor the implementation of policy and legislation.244  
 
5.3. Monitoring and intervention for compliance  
 
Section 62 of the WSA provides for the monitoring of all water services institutions by 
the National and provincial spheres to ensure compliance with prescribed norms and 
standards for improved water sector performance.245 Effective monitoring helps to 
identify the nature of non-compliance challenge in order to have relevant and 
effective intervention measures. For instance, the basis for non-compliance with 
norms and standards for effluent discharge could be lack of integrated water 
development planning. In this case, non-compliance with the prescripts of integrated 
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planning would no doubt lead to non-compliance with managing the waste water 
infrastructure. Any intervention that does not give regard to the root cause of non-
compliance may not have the intended outcomes. For instance, any intervention to 
coordinate cooperative government initiative with a view to implement government 
policy, would not be sustainable if it does not address the resources which would be 
required.246  
 
Section 139 of the Constitution provides for both national and provincial government 
to intervene, in this context, to force municipalities to execute their water services 
provision function. The intervention of national government after the provincial 
government has failed may be too late especially for water related crises. Both the 
national and provincial governments should intervene at the level of planning to 
ensure that the water services development plans (WSDPs) address the challenges 
of waste water quality management by the WSAs.  
 
The Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support and Interventions (IMSI) Bill of 2013 is an 
initiative to strengthen interventions by provinces and national government in 
municipalities that need assistance. The legislation emphasises the need for early 
warning systems and targeted support before an invocation of an intervention.247 It is 
through effective monitoring that early warning of non-compliance can be detected for 
early support or for an appropriate enforcement mechanism.  
 
The IGRF Act provides a framework for all spheres of government to coordinate and 
monitor the implementation of policy and legislation, and to promote the alignment of 
national, provincial and local plans and expenditures for the realisation of national 
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priorities.248 It provides for intergovernmental relations forums and implementation 
protocols as mechanisms to do this.  
 
5.4 Intergovernmental forums  
 
Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) in the South African context refers to the 
interaction of the different spheres of government.249 These include multiple formal 
and informal processes, channels, structures and institutional arrangements for 
bilateral and multilateral interaction between the spheres of government.250 Although 
the formal structures are legislatively provided and happen at the level of the 
executive, their resolutions are not binding. Many of the informal intergovernmental 
interactions, which are mostly partner institutions in the form of programmes and 
project coordination workshops and meetings,251 happen at technical level. The 
formal structures at executive level could have resolutions endorsed through political 
processes, while the informal structures, which the water sector IGR forums happen 
to be part of, do not have this opportunity. The IGRF Act and other legal processes 
provide for the following forums 
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5.4.1 National Intergovernmental forums  
 
5.4.1.1 President’s Co-ordinating Council (PCC)  
The PCC is convened by the Presidency and serves as a Presidential consultative 
forum to discuss service delivery issues with the Premiers, selected Ministers and the 
South African Local Government Association (SALGA). The PCC focuses on 
overarching intergovernmental relations issues without giving attention to sector-
specific matters.252  
 
5.4.1.2 Cabinet ministers and members of the executive provincial councils (MINMEC) 
The MINMEC serves as a consultative forum for the Minister responsible for a 
functional area, the provincial MECs and SALGA representing local government. The 
MINMEC meetings focus on municipal services, of which water services is only one 
part, and water resources issues would not be fully discussed, if at all.253  
 
5.4.1.3 The Budget Council and Budget Forum  
These are convened by the National Treasury for national government to consult and 
discuss fiscal matters with provincial and local governments. This forum should also 
discuss the cessation or ring-fencing of funds as a punitive measure to non-compliant 
municipalities.254 The Minister responsible for water management ideally should be 
part of this forum to sensitise the budgeting process about the necessity of making 
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sure there are adequate resources for the water management at local government 
level.  
 
5.4.1.4 Council of Education Ministers  
This is a statutory body stablished to oversee and manage the education system and 
related programmes. Such related programmes would be water and sanitation, 
among others. Water and sanitation issues are critical in schools and the water 
sector is always called upon for any water and sanitation challenges in schools as 
well as in the health sector. The participation of the Minister responsible for water 
management would be useful in facilitating that this forum considers allocating 
funding for water and sanitation as one of its priorities.  
 
5.4.1.5 Integrated authorisation  
In his address on the occasion of opening the fifth session of Parliament in 2014,255 
the President Zuma announced a process to harmonise the authorisation of water 
use licence applications (WULA), the Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and 
the prospecting and mining licences, by the relevant authorities. The NWA was 
amended256 to effect this harmonisation. In support of Craigie, Snijman and Fourie,257 
it would make sense if the same departments would also institutionalise the joint 
monitoring of compliance with the implementation of the conditions of licence for a 
cumulative impact of the enforcement programme.  
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Other than the latter forum, the Minister responsible for water does not participate in 
the PCC and the MINMEC meetings and has no statutory forum to interact with 
municipalities. The Minister only attends the PCC and MINMEC meetings by 
invitation to report or respond to specific water-related issues that may have a 
bearing on other infrastructure development programmes such as the area of human 
settlements or agriculture.258 There is no formal recourse for the Minister responsible 
for water to intervene directly when municipalities do not respond efficiently to water 
sector policy implementation.259 The following informal structures have been 
established within the water sector.  
 
5.4.1.6 The Water Sector Leadership Group (WSLG)  
The WSLG is purely a technical national forum established to guide the water 
services sector in order to promote sector collaboration and strengthen the 
coordination) of water services and water resources regulation.  
 
5.4.2. The Provincial Intergovernmental Forums  
 
5.4.2.1 The Premier’s Co-ordinating Forum (PCFs) 
The PCF serves to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations between a 
province and its municipalities. The DWS is represented at the PCF but it encounters 
the same frustration where the discussions are not focused on water service delivery 
and water resources management.  
 
                                                          
 
258
 DWAF Guide (2005).  
259
 DWAF Guide (2005) 46. 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
5.4.2.2 The Provincial Liaison Committees (PLCs) 
The PLCs are forums between the DWS and relevant provincial departments 
established to identify priority challenges as experienced by municipalities with 
regards to water services policy implementation. Municipalities are represented by 
SALGA. The PLCs and PSTTs also fall in the category of informal, technical forums 
whose resolutions might not have political endorsement.  
 
5.4.2.3 Western Cape Environmental Crime Forum (WCECF) 
WCECF is an initiative of the Western Cape Provincial Minister of Local Government, 
Environmental Affairs and Development Planning. According to the Minister,260 the 
forum is a collaborative engagement with relevant key stakeholders with the aim, 
inter alia, to improve the effectiveness of the enforcement of compliance with 
environmental laws and give effect to the constitutional imperative of co-operative 
governance. This is an important forum as it is a coordinated voice for the protection 
of the environment and, by implication, of water resources. 
 
5.4.3. Local Intergovernmental Forums  
Encouraging cooperation within the local government sphere for municipalities to 
share best practice should benefit not only waste water management but the broader 
service delivery system. The District Intergovernmental Forums (DIFs) and the 
intermunicipality forums established in terms of Chapter 2 of the IGRF Act261 are 
probably the most important forums that should be encouraged and supported for 
effective service delivery by government.  
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5.4.3.1 District Intergovernmental Forums 
The (DIFs)262 are Mayoral Forums established to facilitate inter-sphere cooperation 
and promote cooperative governance between a district municipality and its local 
municipalities. If utilised to their full extent, the DIFs are the most important forums for 
service delivery because the District municipalities, as water services authorities, are 
responsible for local policy making (by-laws) and are the regulators. They have the 
responsibility to coordinate integrated planning and reporting as well as policy 
implementation. The DIFs should be recognised as consultative forums which 
provide efficient response for the implementation of national and provincial 
development programmes. The processes and discussions happening within the 
DIFs or any local intergovernmental forum could provide a basis for sound 
enforcement.  
 
5.4.3.2 Intermunicipality forums  
These are consultative forums for municipalities to discuss by-laws and 
implementation challenges. 263 They are important forums for municipalities to share 
best practice.264 These are ideal forums for sector Departments to provide targeted 
support to local government at community level. Creating awareness around national 
legislation, norms and standards as well as educating communities on their by-laws 
would go a long way in creating a stronger cooperative government.    
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5.4.3.3 DWS / Municipal Bilateral forums 
The Bilateral forums are convened by the DWS and take place between the DWS 
and the District Municipalities, including metropolitan municipalities and are aimed at 
identifying support needs of municipalities. Attendance and participation of 
municipalities is very poor and the forums do not have structured programmes for 
support as per the intended outcome. These are an unnecessary duplication and do 
not add value to solving water management challenges caused by the malfunctioning 
WWTWs. A prudent approach would be for sector departments to participate in local 
government forums, like the DIFs and intermunicipality forums, to integrate and 
strengthen policy implementation processes. Bojanala Platinum District Municipality, 
in the North West Province, has involved sector departments as early as 2005.265  
 
5.4.3.4 The Western Cape Water Care Forum (WCWCF) 
This serves as a platform for the DWS to interact with local government and the 
water sector in the province with regards to water management. It is utilised as a 
vehicle to support municipalities with the implementation of water laws and 
regulations. It is meant to facilitate the Blue Drop and Green Drop audit processes. 
The forum is specifically designed to encourage municipalities to discuss and share 
best practices with the implementation of water sector regulations.  
 
Encouraging inter-sphere cooperation is an internationally recognised standard 
practice. In the Netherlands, the Inspectorate for Environmental Protection is an 
agency of central government established in partnership with the union of 
Netherlands municipalities to encourage municipal cooperation for prudent and 
efficient use of resources. This, among other things, led the Netherlands municipal 
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councils to consider compliance and enforcement reports of municipalities which 
have been endorsed by the Inspectorate, a national body. In South Africa, inter-
sphere cooperation is institutionalised, and the South African Local Government 
Association (SALGA) is assigned to facilitate intra- and inter-sphere relations.266 The 
question is whether SALGA complies with this statutory function. 
 
5.4.4. The current IGR forums and processes have no impact 
Reflecting on the existing intergovernmental relations forums, Levy and Tapscott 
argue that there is poor coordination and integration because of lack of capacity and 
high levels of inefficiency in government rather than a problem of procedure.267 More 
than ten years after this observation, there is still evidence of poor intergovernmental 
coordination and integration and it would seem it is more a problem of not having 
processes and procedures in place to manage the IGR forums, than lack of capacity.  
 
A study conducted by the then national Department of Provincial and Local 
Government (DPLG) in 1999 found that MINMECs were ineffective for the purpose 
for which they were established. This can, among other things, be attributed to lack of 
clear processes and procedures, no targeted outcomes and timeframes for service 
delivery. They fit the description of being informal, less stable and uncoordinated 
partner institutions.268 The NEMA advocates that the law should establish not only 
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institutions but also procedures to facilitate and promote cooperative government and 
intergovernmental relations.269 It is processes, procedures and systems that should 
determine the level of capacity and efficiency needed to manage a service delivery 
programme. 
 
The initiative of signing Service Delivery Agreements (SDAs) between the different 
national departments in 2009 was a good attempt to implement the principles of 
cooperative governance and intergovernmental relations. However, it did not seem to 
be an initiative that fully recognised the role and input of local government in service 
delivery. The focus of the Presidential Monitoring and Evaluation was the signing of 
the SDAs among departments, signing performance agreements by Ministers and 
monitoring the performance of the executive. The process did not consider that real 
service delivery can only be quantified at local government level.  
 
The enforcement protocol initiated by the DWS in an effort to facilitate compliance by 
municipalities through cooperative government efforts270 has not achieved the 
desired outcomes. DWS’s enforcement protocol, appearing at Figure 4 below,  falls 
short in terms of being a cooperative governance mechanism to enforce compliance 
as it does not address the role of local government. It merely makes the statement 
that ‘cooperating with other sectors and spheres of government is the key feature of 
the enforcement protocol’.271 The limitation of DWS’s protocol is that it was never 
discussed with and agreed upon by municipalities. It is thus in contradiction with the 
constitutional principle that requires consultation using agreed or accepted 
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procedures for initiatives that affect the legal status and power of local 
government.272 If anything, the DWS’s enforcement protocol is useful only as an 
internal business process to guide the DWS in responding to emergency pollution. 
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Figure 4: DWA's Generic Enforcement Protocol of the Department of Water and Sanitation 
 
Source: National Water Services Regulation Strategy (2010), page 53 
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According to Levy,273 the early IGR forums were appropriate for communication of 
policy and projection of government vision but did not encourage debate, align and 
monitor policy at different levels of government. The introduction of a government-
wide integrated planning process requires coordination of national and provincial 
government programmes at local government level. According to Powell, this would 
introduce a new set of government structures that would influence a new pattern of 
intergovernmental relations.274 For instance, the change of focus by the DWS from 
streamlining its support function to being a strong regulator or an enforcer would 
demand a different pattern of IGR forum and/or interaction that is regulation-based.  
 
There is general acknowledgment that intergovernmental relations are always 
dynamic and evolve with changing socio-economic and political relations.275 The 
effectiveness of a compliance and enforcement program depends largely on the 
extent to which the regulation being enforced is a priority at different levels of 
government. There is no doubt that regulating in pursuit of acceptable levels of water 
quality is a priority at all levels of government and is beneficial to the public. It is a 
constitutionally required intervention to maintain national security and essential 
minimum standards in the interest of the country.276 Waste water quality 
management does not seem to be dealt with as a national priority, particularly by 
local government, even though it falls within its core mandate. It is not understood as 
one of the important pre-requisites for the provision of water in a sustainable manner 
and for promoting safe and healthy environment. This is evidenced by either the 
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inadequate or no budgeting for the management of WWTWs and not having 
adequately qualified process controllers. 
 
The effectiveness of coordination and monitoring of the implementation of a policy 
depends largely on the Minister responsible for the functional area in question. The 
Act empowers any cabinet minister to establish a national intergovernmental forum to 
promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations in the functional area of his or her 
responsibility.277 Cabinet ministers are not limited in terms of exploring other 
mechanisms beyond those indicated in the Act. This gives the Minister responsible 
for the management of water room to further explore mechanisms for improving 
cooperation with municipalities and within the water sector.  
 
The review of the impact of the IGRF Act in 2008 by the then DPLG recommended, 
among other things, the implementation of an intergovernmental relations system 
which promotes the use of implementation protocols, especially in areas where there 
may not be dedicated statutory IGR forums.278 Following the review, the DPLG 
published an Implementation Protocol Guide as part of the IGR toolkit in order to 
promote integrated planning towards service delivery and better management of IGR 
forums.279 As has been demonstrated above, the water responsibility cuts across all 
spheres, it affects and is affected by other functions within the national and across 
the local government sphere. As such it may not have dedicated IGR forums but may 
identify areas of cooperation within and across spheres and utilise the 
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Implementation Protocols to establish strategic relationships with municipalities for 
targeted monitoring and to facilitate compliance.280  
 
5.5. Using the mechanisms of the IGRF Act more effectively  
 
The IGRF Act provides a legal framework to ensure coherence in governance at all 
spheres and in all sectors. It provides tools for government to cooperate in solving 
challenges of governance and to conduct intergovernmental relations in the spirit of 
the Constitution.281 The IGRF Act can help solve the challenge of enforcement by 
establishing water sector intergovernmental forums, by using implementation 
protocols to resolve water related service delivery challenges and by managing the 
intervention regime through the proposed IMSI legislation.  
 
5.5.1. Water sector intergovernmental forums  
Various reviews of the intergovernmental relations process reveal that there has not 
been any progress with the cooperative government and intergovernmental relations 
structures. All the reviews point to lack of processes and procedures in managing the 
intergovernmental forums, which weakens cooperative government. The government 
has acknowledged this, and according to the CoGTA Deputy Minister, framework 
plans are in place to strengthen cooperative governance. Cooperative Water 
Governance forums (WGFs) could be established to promote compliance in the same 
manner. NEMA envisages the promotion of Cooperative Environmental Governance 
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(CEG) between the spheres of government.282 According to Kotzé283 the CEG is a 
strategy to address governance inefficiencies caused by fragmentation. 
.  
5.5.2. Implementation Protocol 
The Implementation Protocol is a memorandum of understanding that constitutes a 
formal agreement or a code of conduct and is binding on all the parties involved.284 It 
facilitates commitment from all parties involved to comply with the rules of the 
protocol consequently comply with the regulations. Du Plessis285 describes the 
implementation protocol as an approach similar to the law of contract, one which is 
not always negative but can be used as a valuable measure for compliance and 
enforcement.  
 
The IGRF Act286 provides for the establishment of intergovernmental structures that 
will be actualised in terms of the Implementation Protocol to monitor policy 
Implementation. Implementation protocols would be suitable for the municipalities 
and the DWS to use for managing the implementation of the water value chain, the 
effectiveness of which depends on the strength of the relationship of the two spheres.  
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If the WWTWs are a priority risk, they should also be treated as a national priority 
which must be managed with clear processes and procedures. The importance of the 
implementation protocol is that it forces the parties involved to expressly agree on 
where to find the resources and how to utilise them. The source and use of resources 
has never been expressly discussed when coordinating a programme, and this has 
been one of the greatness weaknesses crippling government programmes. The 
protocols present the forums with an opportunity to agree on the source of funding, 
the outcomes and assigning roles and responsibilities.287 Documenting and signing of 
the implementation protocol as well as the inclusion of the dispute resolution 
mechanism makes for a water-tight service delivery commitment by all spheres of 
government and parties to the protocol.288 
 
As the challenges of non-compliance are diverse, signing protocols with different 
municipalities for targeted intervention support would be the right approach for the 
management of WWTWs. Targeted intervention based on signed commitments by 
various municipalities will provide the Minister responsible for water affairs with a 
statutory mechanism to formalise the relationship between the DWS and 
municipalities. The absence of a formalised relationship compromises the effective 
implementation of water sector policies and laws at local government level. In support 
of targeted protocols, Levy points out that the proliferation of IGR institutions is a 
universal experience in most federal political systems.289 These arise in response to 
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specific situations and could also develop pragmatically and not necessarily as a 
constitutional requirement.290  
 
It would be prudent for the DWS to identify, prioritise and sign strategic 
implementation protocols with municipalities at senior administration or political levels 
for the urgency that the management of WWTWs deserves. The respective forums 
should be constituted and managed by officials from municipalities and not be 
represented by SALGA, as is currently happening in MINMECs and many other 
forums. Steytler291 also cautions that representation of local government by 
organised local government puts municipalities in a disadvantaged position as 
discussions are usually not based and considered on challenges as faced by the 
municipalities. This approach ensures that local government is self-regulating and 
accountable.292 The Minister should use the power to gazette and issue regulations 
and guidelines regarding the implementation protocols to institutionalise the 
cooperative relationship between the municipalities and the DWS.293 The review of 
the IGRF Act referred to recommended that all three spheres should continue to 
improve the quality of intergovernmental planning, among other things, for the 
cumulative impact of government strategies. As has been stated above, the 
intergovernmental planning process, coordinated at the level of the IDP, has no 
statutory sanction except to rely on provincial governments endorsing the plans. The 
Implementation Protocol approach would be the appropriate mechanism to achieve 
this vision of integrated planning and reporting. The protocol may also be useful in 
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examining why the CEG strategy has not been able to address the challenges of 
fragmentation. 294 
 
5.5.3. Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support and Intervention (IMSI) legislation 
During the occasion of the release of the Inaugural Report on the implementation of 
the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, the then Minister of DPLG, Minister 
Mufamadi said that government priority was to ensure that the provincial and national 
spheres have the necessary capacity to play their part in cooperative government 
and to discharge their responsibilities to monitor, support and regulate local 
government.295 
 
The proposed IMSI Bill of 2013 is modelled to a degree around the principles of the 
Implementation Protocol. The Bill aims to assist national and provincial governments 
to comply with its constitutional obligations to support, supervise and build capacity of 
the local sphere for the latter to competently execute its statutory functions. It 
proposes a need for targeted monitoring, oversight and support mechanisms before 
the invocation of an intervention. It provides for the early detection of performance 
failures so as to cut down on interventions which have not had any effect so far and 
may be disruptive to service delivery processes. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
As indicated above, the intergovernmental structures prescribed by the IGRF Act do 
not have the executive decision-making powers for binding and enforceable 
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resolutions and as such do not seem to have succeeded in cohering with policy 
implementation and service delivery. The informal nature of the water sector forums 
offers some flexibility to have coordination mechanisms that are appropriate to 
specific policy implementation needs but the resolutions are also neither binding nor 
enforceable. The significance of water in the service delivery system of government 
demands some measure of certainty of how the water function is coordinated 
between the national and local spheres of government. The prescribed enforcement 
measures have not been able to facilitate compliance in order to guarantee this 
certainty. The IGRF Act offers some scope to embark on alternative measures to 
support and promote compliance in the water sector. This allows for the 
establishment of water sector intergovernmental forums, the signing and adoption of 
implementation protocols for targeted intervention as well as the intervention (IMSI) 
Bill. The close monitoring system for the early detection of challenges as proposed by 
the IMSI Bill is an effective intervention that will contribute to the sustainability of 
service delivery.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis addressed three questions. The first was whether municipalities, in 
operating and managing the WWTWs, are complying with nationally prescribed 
norms and standards for managing effluent discharge. The WSA as the key 
legislation regulating the water services sector clearly spells out that all spheres of 
government are responsible to ensure all people have equal access to water and 
sanitation services. The statistical evidence from government reports, research 
papers, complaints from the agricultural sector, industry and consumers which was 
examined showed that there are high levels of non-compliance by municipalities. . A 
range of factors were identified as reasons for  municipalities failing to manage waste 
water and effluent discharge as part of their constitutional mandate. These included a 
lack of capacity and accountability on the part of municipalities, but also, given the 
intergovernmental structure of the water sector under the constitution and legislation, 
significant failures by the other two spheres to oversee and support local government 
in providing basic services.  
 
The problem of non-compliance by municipalities should be understood and 
addressed in the context of the overall system of cooperative government, which 
requires national and provincial spheres of government to comply with their 
obligations to monitor the performance of local government, intervene to correct 
failures, provide support and strengthen local capacity to execute water delivery 
functions. There is a growing body of literature supporting this view that while local 
government must take responsibility for failures, the challenges with service delivery 
are in part due to failings in meaningful cooperative governance across government.  
The second question was what effective enforcement measures could be utilised by 
the DWS to improve enforcement and compliance by municipalities. The constitution 
and national legislation provide a wide array of enforcement measures, which were 
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critically examined. The key finding was one of the most important factors 
constraining enforcement was the fact that the intergovernmental arrangement of 
water functions (the structure of the sector) made it difficult for the DWS to employ 
enforcement measures such as criminal, administrative and common law-based on 
municipalities. Despite the clearly identified problem and evidence of water resources 
being polluted, the DWS has not been able to effectively enforce compliance by 
municipalities in terms of national norms and standards and related regulations. A 
cooperative governance approach was identified as a need to improve compliance 
and enforcement, specifically better utilisation of mechanisms to monitor that such 
tools are used effectively by all spheres for a coordinated response to challenges of 
water quality management. Improving cooperative government in the water sector 
was a key mechanism to address the problem of non-compliance by the local 
government and non-enforcement by national government. 
 
The final question was how the IGRF Act could be used to assist the DWS to improve 
compliance and enforcement through promoting better coordination of 
intergovernmental relations and oversight of compliance with the NWA and its 
regulations. This thesis examined all the existing formal and informal 
intergovernmental relations structures provided for in the IGRF Act in all spheres and 
all sectors. The area of cooperative governance has been extensively reviewed, with 
all reviews pointing to the need to coordinate and strengthen cooperative government 
to achieve the intended strategic objective of government. The principles of 
cooperative government and intergovernmental relations are constitutionally provided 
to enable government in all spheres to work together in an integrated manner and 
coordinate their actions for efficient implementation of policy and effective provision 
of services.  
 
The integrated development of planning and reporting is one of the key statutory 
tools which has regrettably failed to bring the intended efficiency in the service 
delivery programme of government. The IGRF Act provides the water sector with 
tools to enhance cooperative governance for effective management service delivery 
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and, in the context of this thesis, the management of the water value chain. Following 
on the trend of cooperative environmental governance (CEG), this thesis has argued 
for the water sector cooperative arrangements in the form of three approaches, 
namely, intergovernmental forums, implementation protocols and a strengthened 
monitoring programme for support and management of intervention provided for by 
the Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support and Intervention (IMSI) Bill.  
 
Implementation protocols set a good foundation for a smooth implementation of the 
provisions of the IMSI Bill. The IMSI Bill compliments the IGRF Act in that it seeks to 
strengthen and facilitate that all spheres of government execute their respective roles 
for meaningful cooperative governance. Consequently, its intention to monitor for 
early warnings in order to avoid interventions helps to prevent the problem of 
enforcement from arising.  
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